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Zusammenfassung 
Über unsere Sinne erreichen uns in jeder Sekunde unzählige Signale, deren 
Weiterverarbeitung durch die Kapazität unseres kognitiven Systems limitiert und deshalb nur in 
begrenztem Maße möglich ist. Um adaptives Verhalten sicherzustellen, muss eine sinnvolle 
Auswahl aus der Fülle verfügbarer Informationen getroffen werden. Aufmerksamkeitsprozesse 
gelten als die zentralen Mechanismen der Reizselektion. Aus evolutionspsychologischer 
Perspektive erscheint es sinnvoll, emotionalen Gesichtern eine herausragende Rolle für die 
Überlebenssicherung zuzuschreiben und aus diesem Grund einen Aufmerksamkeitsvorteil 
derselben anzunehmen. Diese theoretische Annahme wurde in der Vergangenheit mit 
unterschiedlichsten Ansätzen untersucht. Es fanden sich Belege für eine bevorzugte Verarbeitung 
von emotionalen Reizen, Gesichtern und im Speziellen auch emotionalen Gesichtern (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
Dennoch zeigt ein genauer Blick auf die jeweiligen Studiendesigns, dass die Ergebnislage 
heterogen und uneindeutig ist. Viele Emotionseffekte lassen sich nicht replizieren, basieren auf 
sehr speziellen Stichproben oder benötigen besondere Bedingungen.  
Das Anliegen der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es deshalb, zu untersuchen, ob und unter 
welchen Bedingungen emotionale Gesichter Aufmerksamkeit auf sich ziehen. Dazu wurden zwei 
experimentelle Paradigmen herangezogen: zum einen das Dot-Probe-Paradigma, mit dem 
untersucht wurde, inwiefern aufgabenirrelevante exogene Störreize in Form emotionaler 
Gesichter die Zielreizverarbeitung stören, und zum anderen das Flankierreizparadigma, bei dem 
die Zielreize zeitgleich mit den Störreizen dargeboten werden und folglich in direkter 
Konkurrenz stehen. Bewusst wurde eine unselektierte Stichprobe rekrutiert, bei der nicht von 
erhöhten Angstwerten auszugehen ist.  
Eine bevorzugte Selektion emotionaler im Vergleich zu neutralen Gesichtern erfolgte nur 
dann, wenn die Emotionsdimension explizit aufgabenrelevant war und die Probanden gezwungen 
wurden, die Störreize zu verarbeiten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass emotionale Reize nicht bottom-
up und damit schnell, ressourcenfrei, unwillentlich und aufgabenunabhängig Aufmerksamkeit 
auf sich ziehen. Es wird diskutiert, inwiefern das Konzept der Relevanz geeignet ist, vorliegende 
Befunde sowie weitere Befunde in der Literatur zu erklären und bisher identifizierte Variablen 
zur Verstärkung von Emotionseffekten in Aufmerksamkeitsparadigmen zusammenzufassen.  
Anschließend wird zudem gezeigt, dass irrelevante Reize bei entsprechenden 
Kontextbedingungen in der Lage sind, das visuelle System auf stereotypkonforme Emotionen 
vorzubereiten. Dies belegt nicht nur eine kontextabhängige Aufmerksamkeitsverschiebung hin 
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zu irrelevanten Reizen, sondern auch eine Einflussnahme der Störreize auf basale visuelle 
Prozesse. Alles in allem zeigt sich, dass die Aufmerksamkeit nur dann den emotionalen 
Gesichtern zugewandt wird, wenn über die reinen Reizeigenschaften hinaus top-down die 
Relevanz der emotionalen Gesichter hoch eingeschätzt wird. Offen bleibt, ob diese top-down-
Einflüsse bereits vor der initialen attentional capture wirksam werden, oder im Rahmen einer 
verzögerten Ablösung von aufgabenrelevanten Reizen nach initialer attentional capture 
entstehen. Die vorliegende Arbeit greift diese Frage im Ausblick auf und bietet einen weiteren 
vielversprechenden Erklärungsansatz an. 
Zusammenfassend zeigt die vorliegende Dissertation, dass emotionale Gesichter nicht, 
wie bisher angenommen, besonderes Potential besitzen, bottom-up unbedingte Aufmerksamkeit 
auf sich zu ziehen. Stattdessen entscheidet stets ein komplexes Zusammenspiel aus Zielen, 
Erfahrungen und anderen Kontextfaktoren darüber, ob in einer gegebenen Situation emotionale 
Reize bevorzugt zur Weiterverarbeitung ausgewählt werden. 
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Summary 
Our senses register numerous signals every second. Further processing of these signals is 
limited by the capacity of our cognitive system and, thus, only partly feasible.  Human beings 
need to select a subset from the high amount of available information in order to behave 
adaptively. For this, attention is considered as the central mechanism of stimulus selection. From 
evolutionary perspective it seems plausible to ascribe emotional faces a pivotal role for survival 
and thus, propose a selection bias for those stimuli. This assumption was tested in various 
attentional paradigms. Evidence for preferred processing of emotional stimuli in general and 
emotional faces in particular has been shown in several studies (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, a closer 
look at the respective experiments shows that the results are rather ambiguous and heterogenous. 
Many emotion effects could not be replicated, were based on special samples, or were contingent 
on very special conditions.  
Therefore, the aim of the present dissertation was to investigate if and under what 
circumstances emotional faces capture visual attention. For this purpose, two experimental 
paradigms were used. In the dot-probe paradigm, on the one hand, attentional capture of two 
distractor stimuli, which were simultaneously presented before the target display, was measured. 
In the flanker paradigm, on the other hand, the target stimuli were presented simultaneously with 
the distractor, and thus a direct competition between distractors and top-down relevant target was 
present.  
Furthermore, the sample was intentionally recruited in a mixed student population, where 
heightened anxiety is implausible. This was important because anxious people have been 
demonstrated to show special attention to emotional stimuli, which might indicate that the 
mechanism of attention to emotion is not representative for a normal population.   
A preferred selection of emotional faces compared to neutral faces was found only when 
emotions were relevant to the task and distractor processing was mandatory. These results show 
that emotional facial stimuli are not capturing attention purely bottom-up, i.e. fast, resource free, 
involuntarily, and independently from the current task. It is discussed if and how the concept of 
relevance might be used to explain the present findings as well as former findings. Furthermore, 
it is outlined, how the concept of relevance helps to summarize already identified variables that 
influence attention allocation to emotional faces.   Additionally, it is shown that irrelevant 
stimulus information is used to tune the visual system to process stereotype-matching information 
if and only if the context renders this information relevant. This indicates not only a context-
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dependent attention allocation to irrelevant stimuli but also an influence of these stimuli on basal 
visual processing.   
All in all, the present work shows that attention is only shifted to emotional faces if, in 
addition to the stimulus properties, their relevance is top-down considered high enough. It 
remains open whether these top-down influences manifest before the initial attentional capture 
or later in the form of a delayed disengagement from task-relevant stimuli after an initial task-
independent attentional capture. The present dissertation discusses this question in the outlook 
section and offers a new promising and eventually connected account for explanation.   
In a nutshell, the present dissertation shows that emotional faces have no extraordinary 
potential to capture attention bottom-up. Instead, a complex interaction of goals, experiences and 
other contextual factors determine which stimuli are selected for further processing in a given 
situation. 
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1 Theory 
1.1 Introduction 
Our cognitive capacities are not sufficient to process all incoming sensory information. 
In a first pre-attentive processing stage numerous environmental stimuli are processed in parallel. 
Deeper conscious processing, however, proceeds serially and is strictly limited to a small number 
of stimuli. Therefore, humans developed mechanisms that help selecting some stimuli for further 
processing and reject others. The central mechanism for this purpose is attention. Following the 
definitions of researchers in the field, this task is mainly fulfilled by attentional selection. Katsuki 
and Constantinides (2014, p. 1), for example, state that 
‘Selecting the most relevant stimuli in the physical world for processing while filtering 
out less relevant information allows us to respond quickly to critical environmental 
changes and achieve behavioral goals more efficiently. This process of information 
selection is referred to as attention.’ (Katsuki & Constantinides, 2014, p. 1) 
 
A hotly debated question is, which stimuli are relevant. On the one hand, humans need to 
focus on stimuli in the environment, which are useful for their current goals and tasks, while 
ignoring those stimuli that are obviously not useful to this end. On the other hand, however, 
people still need to detect unexpected events that might be life-threatening and are in this sense 
evolutionary relevant. Therefore, it is assumed that, in addition to task relevant components, 
certain stimulus features capture attention in an involuntary fashion. 
To answer the question of which stimuli elicit attention automatically bottom-up, 
researchers referred to experiments where bottom-up attentional capture has been demonstrated 
for sudden onset stimuli, stimuli that differ from the surrounding in terms of movement direction, 
speed, color, brightness or size (Duncan & Humphreys 1989; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Miller, 
1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Chapter 1.1.1 to 1.1.3 aim at introducing different objects of 
attention that are believed to be selected preferentially.  
 
1.1.1 Attention to Evolutionary Relevant Stimuli 
The process of willful, resource-consuming, goal-directed stimulus selection is called 
top-down attention, the latter process of involuntary, automatic, fast, capacity-free, goal-
 
2 
independent stimulus selection is called bottom-up attention. When stimuli elicit bottom-up 
attentional shifts, this is called attentional capture. From a more theoretical point of view, 
however, not only simple perceptual characteristics are thought to define bottom-up-relevant 
stimuli, but also more complex but survival relevant stimuli like weapons, spiders, snakes and 
emotional faces. It is evolutionary relevant to rapidly detect and discriminate emotions in order 
to respond adequately and quickly to potentially survival-relevant stimuli, even while engaging 
in a current task. Therefore, it is proposed, that the cognitive system has a special threat module, 
that is realized through a dedicated neural circuit, in order to deal with evolutionary relevant 
sources of threat (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This module is assumed to detect and process threat 
relevant stimuli in an automatic fashion without cognitive control. Accordingly, numerous 
studies were able to demonstrate an attentional bias to threat-related stimuli (; West, Anderson, 
& Pratt, 2009), i.e. a bias for weapons (Steblay, 1992), spiders (Devue, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2011, Öhman, Flykt, Esteves, 2001), snakes (Lipp & Waters, 2007; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, 
2011, Öhman et al., 2001), and angry faces (Fox et al., 2000; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002, 
Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). Attention to threat is important for survival. However, other 
stimuli in the environment should also be attended do guarantee the specie’s survival. 
 
1.1.2 Attention to Faces 
Other human beings are central to the survival of our social species. Not only do we have 
to identify conspecifics for reproduction, we also need caregivers in early and late life. We need 
to cooperate to gather the basic goods for survival and to fight dangers. Additionally, the 
transmission of knowledge enabled humans to retain experiences of one generation and pass it 
on to the next. Cooperation, child care and reproduction necessitate a processing of social signals. 
Faces play a pivotal role in social interactions („Social communicative function of emotions“: 
Bavelas & Chovil, 1997; Chovil, 1997; Oatley, 1988; Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008; 
Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). Shortly after birth infants are able to 
discriminate faces from other stimuli and prefer the former over the latter (Fantz, 1963; Johnson, 
Dziurawiec, & Morton, 1991; Macchi, Turati, & Simion, 2004; Mondloch et al., 1999; Valenza, 
Simion, Cassia, & Umiltà, 1996). Moreover, they prefer the face of their mother over unfamiliar 
faces (Bushnell, 2001; Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 1989; Field, Cohen, Garcia, & Greenberg, 1984; 
Pascalis, deSchonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fabre-Grenet, 1995) and mimic facial movements 
(Field, 2007; Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen 1982, Nagy & Molnar, 2004). Accordingly, 
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Brosch, Sander, and Scherer (2007) demonstrated a bias to photographs of laughing babies in 
adults. 
Furthermore, numerous studies demonstrated face biases in adult participants (Palermo 
and Rhodes, 2007; Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2007; Neumann, Mohamed, & 
Schweinberger, 2011; Shah, Gaule, Bird, & Cook, 2013). Humans are experts in recognizing 
faces and have developed strategies for fast recognition of the most important pieces of 
information (e.g, Bruce & Young, 1986). However, recent studies suggest, that attention to faces 
is not automatic in a way, that it cannot be modulated by task demands (Bindemann, Burton, 
Langton, Schweinberger, & Doherty, 2007). Instead attention to task relevant objects cannot be 
prevented by presentation of irrelevant faces, even at very short SOAs. However, irrelevant faces 
slow down responses to relevant objects thereby preventing complete top-down attentional 
control. 
1.1.3 Attention to Emotional Faces 
In addition to the face per se, the preparedness for a preferred processing of emotional 
facial expressions is evolutionary beneficial. The anticipation of behaviors of other people 
enables a person to prepare for a potential interaction, collect information on the other person’s 
attitudes and evaluations, cooperate, anticipate a fight, or avoid conflicts in advance by adequate 
social behavior. It enables parents to interpret their children’s needs and worries, which is a 
prerequisite for caregiving. Furthermore, the detection and classification of emotional faces 
allows for silent communication, for example while sneaking up prey. Facial expressions are, 
like other threat signals, good indicators of the presence and location of threat and additionally 
offer information on the availability of conspecifics for cooperation or reproduction. Correctly 
classified, emotional faces provide information on social opportunities (happiness) and dangers 
(fear), interpersonal conflicts (anger), need for care (sadness), or the eventuality of contamination 
(disgust). In contrast to relatively stable characteristics, such as identity and gender, emotional 
expressions are continuously modified. The temporal transience and the high relevance of 
dangers, conflicts, opportunities, or the risk of contamination require a pretty fast recognition of 
emotional faces, which in turn necessitates early attentional mechanisms that ensure processing. 
Consequently, the discrimination of emotional and especially the detection of threat related facial 
expressions has been found to be prioritized in visual processing (Eastwood et al., 2001; Fox, 
Lester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler, & Dutton, 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist, & 
Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Schupp et al., 2004; Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002). 
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In sum, theoretical considerations suggest, that emotional faces are attended in a 
continuous, automatic fashion even when the actual goal is not directly related to facial 
information. It seems reasonable that healthy individuals developed a bias to emotional facial 
expressions, i.e. the tendency to preferentially process emotional facial information compared to 
other stimuli.  
The attentional effects of emotional stimuli including emotional faces have been intensely 
investigated in the past. However, there is still no consensus on the mechanisms and 
preconditions of effects of emotional faces and it still lacks a comprehensive model that allows 
for reliable predictions on attentional mechanisms concerning emotional stimuli. The aim of this 
dissertation is to combine the extensive research on attentional mechanisms in general with the 
theoretical concept of attention to emotion in order to not only find but also understand attentional 
effects of emotional faces. Therefore, in chapter 1.2 I will introduce the basic concepts of 
prioritization that are relevant for the debate on attentional effects of emotional faces. In chapter 
1.3 I will present evidence for prioritization of emotional faces and narrow the focus by referring 
to the inconsistent findings in different experimental paradigms. In chapter 1.4 I will summarize 
the presented inconsistencies and deduce my research question.  
 
1.2 Mechanisms of prioritization  
Several information processing mechanisms are thought to be involved in the 
prioritization of emotional faces. The present chapter will delineate those mechanisms and 
present relevant results and debates.  
1.2.1 Subcortical Pathway  
In line with the theoretical consideration of the pivotal role of emotional and particularly 
threatening facial expressions, some researchers propose the existence of a subcortical visual 
pathway, which quickly transmits threat signals (DeGelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & 
Hadjikhani, 2004; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998; Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010). Empirical 
studies showed that processing via this path is independent of conscious perception and guides 
the selection process without conscious attention. (Öhman, 2005; Öhman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, 
& Ingvar, 2007).  It is assumed that survival relevant stimuli, such as danger signals, are 
processed fast and unconsciously via this route, passing amygdala, superior colliculus and 
pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, which allows for a rapid response (Öhman, 2005; Öhman et al., 
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2007; Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010). Evidence for this assumption comes from studies which 
demonstrate that the amygdala can be activated independently from cortical structures, is 
activated in the presence of affective stimuli (Breiter et al., 1996) and even without conscious 
perception of these stimuli (e.g. Öhman, 2005). Batty & Taylor (2003) showed differences 
between emotions in event related potentials (ERPs) as early as 140ms (N170) after stimulus 
onset. Especially fearful faces lead to increased P1. Imaging methods (fMRI) provided evidence 
of amygdala activation (and consecutive fusiform cortex activity) after presentation of faces 
(Vuilleumier & Portuois, 2007) and emotional facial expressions (Breiter et al., 1996) as well as 
emotional words (Isenberg, 1999). Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan (2001) even found 
that activation by fearful stimuli was independent of task and took place even when the emotional 
stimuli appeared in an unattended task-irrelevant location. This might suggest, that emotional 
stimuli automatically capture visual attention.  Additionally, there is increasing evidence that 
amygdala activation is not only related to threat (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; 
Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004) but also other evolutionary relevant 
stimuli (Sander & Zalla, 2003). Thus, the ‘fast route’ might be involved in the processing of 
socially relevant stimuli as well.  
The subcortical activations in response to emotional stimuli have been found to be 
integrated into cortical conflict resolution structures.  Egner, Atkins, Gale, & Hirsch (2008) as 
well as Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch (2006) found evidence for two separate cortical 
pathways to resolve emotional conflicts vs. non-emotional conflicts. They demonstrate an 
association of conflict resolution in the non-emotional task with activation of the right dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC). In contrast conflict resolution in emotional tasks was associated 
with activation of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) which was directly associated with 
inhibition of amygdala responses to emotional distractors. Activation of LPFC to the contrary 
was associated to increased activation of face sensitive areas of the visual cortex but not 
amygdala. This replicates previous findings of other authors (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2000; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Egner and Hirsch 2005a, 
2005b). Thus, the rACC is not only activated in response to irrelevant emotional stimuli (Bishop, 
Duncan, & Brett. 2004) but also explicitly responsible for emotional stimuli (Bush et al. 1998; 
Whalen et al. 1998; Mohanty et al. 2007) in interaction with subcortical structures that are 
believed to provide a fast route for processing of emotional stimuli. 
However, amygdala activation is also modulated by other factors, like situational 
variables or selection history (Huff, Wright-Hardesty, Higgins, Matus-Amat, & Rudy, 2005; 
Hobbin, Goosens, & Maren, 2003; Maren & Hobbin, 2007) but also task difficulty and processing 
resources (Bishop et al., 2007; Lim, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2008; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, 
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Ungerleider, 2002; van Dillen, Heslenfel, & Koole, 2009,). Additionally, variations in amygdala 
activation have been shown to reflect top-down interpretation processes (Phelps et al., 2001).   
Furthermore, it has been hypothesized, that the fast route operates with low spatial 
frequency components. However, Stein, Seymour, Hebart, and Sterzer (2014) found, that fearful 
faces were preferentially processed in the high spatial frequency spectrum. This is consistent with 
the findings of Smith and Schyns (2009) and casts doubt on the notion that fearful faces are 
processed via the subcortical fast route. However, angry faces are informative in the low spatial 
frequency spectrum. 
In sum, neuroscientific evidence for a subcortical fast route is not clear cut.   
Additionally, the findings outlined above do not permit inferences on the exact behavioral 
outcomes. Therefore, in addition to subcortical explanations, there are also many theories that try 
to explain the processing of emotional stimuli on a cortical basis. A precise definition of 
attentional effects which are elicited by emotional faces requires an overview of the main 
theoretical concepts of attention in general and respective findings. Traditionally, two types of 
attentional control are distinguished: bottom-up stimulus-driven (exogenous) attention and top-
down goal-driven (endogenous) attention. 
1.2.2 Top-Down Influences on Attention 
As ‘top-down’ are considered all attentional processes that are not caused by the stimulus 
itself but are contingent on task requirements or current goals of the observer. Top-down signals 
cause an increase in neuronal activity in those structures that represent the task-relevant location, 
shape, or color (Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014). This facilitates target detection. In a seminal 
cueing study, Posner, Snyder, and Davidson (1980) presented a cue stimulus in the center of the 
screen (endogenous cue), that indicated one of two possible target positions. When the cue was 
informative for the actual target position, participants were faster to detect targets whose position 
was correctly cued by the central stimulus than targets whose position was either un-cued or 
wrongly cued. This is seen as evidence for an influence of top-down information in the allocation 
of visual attention above and beyond stimulus properties. Some researchers assume that top-down 
facilitation is the central mechanism behind attentional processes (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994).  
 
First evidence for top-down attentional orienting came from cueing studies. Posner, 
Snyder, and Davidson (1980) for example found benefits in categorizing targets after valid 
symbolic location cues. This shows a goal dependent allocation of covered attention. A stronger 
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debated question however, is if attention can not only be shifted to a certain location due to task 
demands but also focused on certain characteristics, like e.g. shape, color, or size. The classical 
studies that offered evidence for this claim use an additional singleton paradigm (Theeuwes, 
1992). In this paradigm, a singleton search display contains an additional non-target singleton 
that either matches the target (e.g. red singleton, red target) or not (e.g. green singleton, red 
target). The typical finding is that matching singletons are attended, while non-matching 
singletons are not (Folk et al., 1992; Folk et al., 1994). Thus, the definition of target features or 
locations seems to drive attention top-down to the objects carrying relevant features only. The 
process is assumed to be conscious and to need cognitive capacity (Folk et al., 1992). Most 
researchers also consider it as voluntary (Baluch & Itty, 2011; Buschman & Miller, 2007; 
Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Folk et al., 1992; Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001; 
Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b, 2018). On a neuronal basis many studies find task dependent activation 
patterns in early stimulus processing (Buracas, Albright, & Sejnowski, 1996; Haenny & Schiller, 
1988; Huk & Heeger, 2000; Moran & Desimone, 1985; Motter, 1993; Treue & Maunsell, 1996). 
However, Stothart, Simons, & Boot (2019) found in an inattentional blindness task that 
attentional capture follows a top-down set in the attended visual area only. Distractors presented 
in unattended areas captured attention irrespective of the task set.  
1.2.3 Bottom-up Influences on Attention 
Bottom-up attention is assumed to be purely stimulus-driven, i.e. certain characteristics 
of the stimulus itself, e.g. sudden onset, abrupt changes in luminance, differing color, movement 
direction, or orientation, make the stimulus pop out (Duncan & Humphreys 1989;Jonides & 
Yantis, 1988;  Miller, 1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), and thus lead to an attentional shift 
toward the stimulus (i.e., attentional capture; Theuwes 1992, 1996, 2010a, 2010b). Theeuwes 
(1992, 1996, 2010a, 2010b) considers all stimulus-induced attentional processes as bottom-up 
when they proceed without conscious will. Consequently, when a task-irrelevant stimulus is 
given attention, the process would be considered as bottom-up.   
The pure capture hypothesis assumes that some stimuli draw attention automatically, 
without binding any resources, unconditionally, fast and independent of current goals or 
contextual conditions (Theeuwes 1992, 1994, 2010). Proponents of this hypothesis assume that 
the so-called pre-attentive phase (i.e., the time interval directly preceding the overt attention shift) 
passes off purely stimulus driven, i.e. bottom-up (Belopolsky et al., 2010; Jonides, 1981; 
McCormick 1997; Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes 2010; Müller & Rabitt, 1989; Posner, 1980; 
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Theeuwes, 1992; 2010a, 2010b). The other end of the spectrum is a top-down mechanism, where 
information processing is initiated by the perceiver rather than by the stimulus. 
1.2.4 Biased Competition, Additive Effects and Priority Maps 
The predominant view in the bottom-up-top-down-debate is the concept of biased 
competition (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Yantis 1996). In this line of reasoning 
it is assumed that selection is a result of solving the conflict of signals from both bottom-up 
stimulus characteristics and top-down task demands. There are several approaches concerning 
the exact interplay of the two mechanisms (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Theeuwes, 2010; Lamy, 
2010; Folk & Remington, 2006; Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989; Yantis, 1996). 
Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, and Vuilleumier (2011) assume at least some modulation by internal 
affective states, for example state or trait anxiety. They propose that attention is modulated by 
three main components, namely endogenous, exogenous and emotional signals. The latter two 
components proceed involuntarily. Recent theories suggest that top-down and bottom-up signals 
are integrated in so-called priority maps (Bisley, 2011; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Theeuwes, 2010a; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). Accumulated relevance signals from different 
sources are ascribed to the different stimuli in order to rank them for attentional prioritization 
within the map. The stimuli or locations with the highest values on the priority map are attended 
for further processing. (for a discussion of this account see chapter 5.6.2). Critically this argues 
against a pure bottom-up account of e.g. Jan Theeuwes (1991, 1992, 1994). Theeuwes claims, 
that effects of target-distractor similarity (i.e. top-down influences of task) are possible, but 
contingent on distractor saliency. In the study of van Zoest and Donk (2004), however, target 
distractor similarity had an effect, that was independent of distractor saliency, i.e. it occurred for 
salient but also for non-salient distractors. 
Cave and Wolfe (1990) proposed in their guided search model two different search 
modes, a parallel stage for salient stimulus features and a serial stage for complex operations. 
The feature search mode is dominated by top-down processes and relies on information on the 
target features. The singleton search mode to the contrary is based on bottom-up stimulus features 
and relies on the capacity of a stimulus to pop out.  
Above and beyond the findings and claims, proponents of the contingent capture 
hypothesis argue that even the very early phase of stimulus selection, which most theories assume 
to be dominated by bottom-up attentional capture, is influenced by endogenous variables, such 
as goals or intentions (Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; Ansorge, Kiss, Worschech, & Eimer, 2011; 
Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Chen & Mordkoff, 2007; Folk & Remington, 2010; Folk et al., 1992; 
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Gibson & Amelio, 2000; Lamy, 2010; Nordfang & Bundesen, 2011). Specifically, the contingent 
capture hypothesis assumes that involuntary capture is limited to stimuli that carry task-relevant 
features or characteristics that match the current attentional set (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Eimer & 
Kiss, 2008; Folk & Annett, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992; Folk, et al., 1994; 
Lamy, 2010; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Zehetleitner, Goschy, Müller, 2012). The authors suppose 
that stimuli are evaluated in the light of the current attentional set pre-attentively, i.e. before 
capture takes place. Thus, stimuli do capture attention when they are salient and relevant for the 
current task (Folk et al., 1992). In line with this, Folk and colleagues (1992, 1994) showed 
attentional effects of cues that incorporated characteristics of the target. Abrupt-onset distractors, 
for example, captured attention when the target was characterized by abrupt onset, too. The 
information on feature relevance is assumed to be determined top-down and to restrict the 
bottom-up attentional capture to a subset of task-relevant stimuli. Fittingly, Spruyt, DeHouwer, 
& Hermans, (2009) demonstrated in an affective priming study that the task-relevance of certain 
dimensions of a prime affects, which dimensions become pre-activated. Although this claim was 
initially based on findings in evaluative priming it is plausible to generalize it to focal attention 
in other paradigms (Everaert, Spruyt, & DeHouwer, 2013). 
In contrast to this early influence of top-down task-constraints, proponents of the pure-
capture account, explain failures to find attentional capture of task-irrelevant salient stimuli by 
the rapid recovery account (Belopolsky et al., 2010; Theeuwes, 2010a, Theeuwes, 2010b). This 
theory states that – although it seems as if task requirements influenced stimulus selection from 
the beginning – attention was initially captured by the salient stimulus. Subsequently, attention 
was rapidly disengaged at around 175ms post-stimulus due to top-down corrections (Theeuwes, 
2010a, 2010b; Kim and Cave, 1999). 
As can be seen, the field of attention research still lacks a consensus on a certain general 
mechanism that would allow for a reliable prediction concerning the effect of emotional faces. 
Nevertheless, research on this question has been conducted, that will be summarized and 
integrated in the next chapter. 
1.2.5 Mixed Theoretical Reasoning 
In sum, there is evidence for both, bottom-up capture as well as top-down influences. On 
the one hand side there is a theoretically plausible high relevance of emotional faces that suggests 
the existence of mechanisms of prioritized processing.  This is consistent with the main message 
of models concerning the fast route, that assume an automatic, fast and efficient processing of 
emotionally relevant stimuli, especially threat signals, via a fast subcortical route. On the other 
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hand-side it is argued that goal directed behavior necessitates mechanisms to select stimuli on 
the basis of task requirements. Therefore, the vast majority of researchers today argues for an 
interplay of bottom-up and top-down mechanisms in attentional prioritization.  
However, it is questionable if natural emotional faces can elicit bottom-up capture at all. 
Natural emotional faces are pretty complex. Thus, a prioritization necessitates a prior processing 
in order to retrieve emotion category information, which seems to be in conflict with theories of 
feature based bottom-up capture. Consequently, a lively debate is devoted to the interplay of 
bottom-up attentional capture and top-down attentional control by emotional facial stimuli. 
 
1.3 Evidence for Attentional Bias to Threat and Emotional 
Faces 
From a theoretical perspective task independent pure attentional capture of threatening stimuli is 
plausible, because a fast detection of threat and initiation of appropriate behavior is an 
evolutionary advantage.  
Not only results of studies on the subcortical pathway but also other neuroscientific investigations 
suggest prioritized processing of emotional faces.  
The present chapter complements these neuroscientific results with behavioral data from different 
attentional paradigms. The paradigms are shortly described to enable the reader to understand the 
discussion of results and conceptual problems of the respective procedure.    
1.3.1 Attentional Blink 
In a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm (Potter & Levy, 1969) several (6-
20) stimuli (originally letters) are presented in rapid succession at the same fixed location (usually 
centrally). When two or more targets are presented within this stream of stimuli, detection of 
further targets (probes) is impaired in a certain time window after presentation of the first target, 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Kanwisher, 1987; Kanwisher & Potter, 1989, 1990; J. E. 
Raymond, K. L. Shapiro, & K. M. Arnell, 1992: Reeves & Sperling, 1986; Weichselgartner & 
Sperling, 1987). The time-slot of impaired processing after an attended stimulus is called 
attentional blink (J. E. Raymond, K. L. Shapiro, & K. M. Arnell, 1992).  Probes that are presented 
in a time window between 180ms and 450ms after target presentation are typically not detected. 
However, when target identification was not required or when a blank screen was presented 
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shortly after target presentation, this attentional blink effect did not occur. The idea is, that the 
lag, i.e. the temporal distance between attended and missed stimuli within the visual stream, is 
informative on the timing of target processing.  
An attentional blink, that is caused by an irrelevant emotional stimulus is called emotional 
attentional blink (McHugo, Olatungi, & Zald, 2013). Most and colleagues (2005) found 
attentional blink effects of irrelevant negative faces that were most pronounced at lag 2, i.e. 
200ms after the negative face. Additionally, the attentional blink was less pronounced for neutral 
faces and absent for scrambled faces. The RSVP design allows to measure if attention is captured 
by an emotional face and how rapidly attention can be disengaged from this stimulus. Arnell, 
Killmann, and Fijavz (2007) found impaired target processing after irrelevant sexually arousing 
distractors but not after negative, threatening, positive, or emotionally neutral distractors. Most, 
Chun, Widders, and Zald (2005) to the contrary found an increased attentional blink caused by 
negative emotional pictures compared to neutral ones at lag 2 but not lag 8. However, it remains 
unclear, which mechanism causes the inability to process subsequent stimuli. There are a 
multitude of theories, including an inhibition model (Raymond et al., 1992), an interference 
model (Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1994), a bottleneck model (Chun & Potter, 1995), 
explanations concerning attentional dwelling (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994) and the idea of 
a loss of control while processing stimuli (Di Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005).   
1.3.2 Visual Search 
Especially results from visual search (Treisman & Souther, 1985) experiments suggest, 
that threatening stimuli are attended involuntarily and capacity-free. This paradigm is analogous 
to the attentional blink paradigm but operates in the spatial rather than temporal dimension.  In 
the visual search paradigm (Treisman & Souther, 1985), participants are supposed to find and 
classify a stimulus that deviates from the surrounding distractor stimuli in a certain dimension, 
e.g. color, shape, or movement direction.  These stimuli are called feature singletons. When 
search is inefficient, reaction time increases linearly with number of distractors (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980). For efficient parallel search however, i.e. when the target pops out, search 
latencies are independent of the number of distractors. Bottom-up stimulus saliency is a 
prerequisite for a parallel search process, which is efficient because no conscious attention and 
only minimal cognitive capacity are needed (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; Jonides, 
1981; McCormick 1997; Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes 2010; Müller & Rabitt, 1989; Posner, 1980; 
Theeuwes, 1992; 2010a, 2010b). Consequently, Öhman and colleagues (2001) not only showed 
faster responses to pictures of snakes or spiders between pictures of plants than to plants between 
 
12 
spiders or snakes, but also an independence of spider search time and snake search time from the 
number of distractors. The search time for plants to the contrary increased with increasing number 
of distractors. This demonstrates a bottom-up saliency of spiders and snakes.  
Processing advantages have also been shown for emotional faces in general compared to 
neutral ones (Eastwood et al., 2001) as well as threatening faces in particular compared to non-
threatening ones (anger superiority effect: Fox et al., 2000; Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; Miller, 
1991; Purcell & Stewart, 2010; for a review, see Frischen et al., 2008). However, the pop out of 
angry faces is not consistently found (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 2011). 
Some studies even demonstrate an advantage of neutral compared to angry faces (Juth, 
Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005). Additionally, the findings of anger superiority in the 
visual search paradigm (Fox et al., 2000; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Horstman & Bauland, 2006, 
Pinkham, Griffin, Barin, Sassin, & Gur, 2010), are challenged by the notion that low level 
confounds of the material impede valid inferences on actual stimulus effects (Horstmann & 
Bauland, 2006; Coelho et al.,2010; Harms & Bundesen, 1983; Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; 
Miller, 1991; Purcell & Stewart, 2010; Purcell, Stewart, & Skov, 1996).  Additionally, Yantis 
and Egeth (1999) pointed out, that the conclusion of stimulus pop-out based on bottom-up 
saliency from fast detected singletons in the visual search paradigm is not correct as long as the 
singleton is also the target, i.e. the top-down relevant stimulus. Horstmann and Becker (2008) 
tested attentional capture of emotional stimuli in a 1/n task and found no evidence for attentional 
capture as long as emotion was task-irrelevant. 
In order to investigate attentional capture by a task-irrelevant distractor, the additional 
singleton paradigm was used (Bacon and Egeth, 1994; Theeuwes, 2004).  In this special search 
task an additional singleton is present that is salient on another dimension, which is not relevant 
for the target task. It is assumed, that attention to these task-irrelevant salient singleton reflects 
involuntary attentional processes that cannot be overridden by top-down attentional control. 
However, Bacon and Egeth (1994) demonstrated that participants can override the bottom-up 
saliency by top-down task sets when a singleton search mode becomes less efficient. When the 
number of targets was increased, the additional singleton could be ignored. Theeuwes (2004) 
answered this critique with results from a comparable experiment. When display size was 
increased, participants attended the additional singleton irrespective of number of targets.  
The aforementioned studies characterize salient stimuli mainly by certain physical 
attributes. Wentura, Müller, & Rothermund (2014) showed, that colors that had been paired with 
gains or losses before, boosted the additional singleton effect, i.e. increased bottom-up attentional 
effects through their relevance as gain or loss signals. Similarly, Schmidt, Belopolsky, and 
Theeuwes (2014) showed that irrelevant stimuli that had been paired with fear in a conditioning 
 
13 
procedure, slowed down visual search. This is seen as evidence for attentional capture of fear-
associated stimuli. Mulckhuyse and Dalmaijer (2016) found increased latencies of saccades 
toward neutral targets in the presence of fear-conditioned distractors.    
Evidence for attention to threatening faces in the additional singleton paradigm is rare. 
Huang, Chang, and Chen (2011) found attentional capture of threatening targets as well as 
impaired disengagement from irrelevant threatening distractors. Additionally, when presentation 
time of the search display was limited to 300ms attention to irrelevant distractors was reduced, 
when the distractor was located outside a 100% validly cued target area. The authors argue, that 
this is evidence for a capacity dependent attentional capture. When resources are scarce, attention 
is top-down focused on the area of interest and stimuli outside of this area no longer capture 
attention. However, this manipulation is not unambiguous. The absence of attentional capture 
might be attributed to the shorter presentation of the search display to a clear top-down set that 
excludes the possibility of target presentation outside the cued area or to both manipulations.   All 
in all, evidence of emotion effects in additional singleton studies is rare, especially with natural 
faces. In sum, visual search paradigms offer no valid clues on attentional capture of emotional 
faces.  
1.3.3 Stroop Interference Task 
Another example of bottom-up attentional processes is often seen in the so-called Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935). Note that in contrast to the visual search paradigm the Stoop task is a non-
spatial paradigm, i.e. it does not measure preferred orienting to a certain location in space but 
rather an attention to certain stimulus features. Participants in the experiments of Stroop (1935) 
had to classify the ink color of presented color-words. The color-naming was slowed when the 
semantic content of the word referred to a different color than the ink. However, considering the 
fact that the task was color-naming, the results are not convincing, because thereby color became 
a relevant feature. In the emotional Stroop task to the contrary, participants are asked to name the 
ink color of emotion-related words. Emotion effects found cannot be attributed to the fact that 
emotions are a relevant feature, which is solving the former problem. Since the meaning of the 
word does not elicit a response that is in opposition to the task-relevant response, the measured 
effects are no interference effects on the response level like those in the original Stroop paradigm 
but rather reflect a disruption of color naming by the emotional content. 
Additionally, Algom et al. (2008) argued, that there is no semantic relation of the meaning 
of the distractors with the target relevant dimension (color) and therefore, the interference is also 
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not comparable to the flanker paradigm, where a dimensional overlap between target and 
distractor can be found. 
Instead, it is argued that the effects are caused by a general slowing of responses or a kind 
of interrupt effect in the presence of emotional stimuli rather than an attentional capture (e.g. 
Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004, Mckenna & Sharma, 2004). It was found that emotional words not 
only impaired color naming, but also reading and lexical decisions. Additionally, this was only 
the case, when emotional and neutral words were presented in blocks (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 
2004) and effects were more pronounced in the trial after the emotional distractor trial (McKenna 
& Sharma, 2004). This is seen as strong evidence of a slow unspecific effect opposed to a fast 
emotion specific attentional effect. Finally, although Stroop effects of emotional stimuli have 
been demonstrated (e.g. Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), they are not consistently found 
in normal participants. With non-anxious participants many emotional Stroop studies fail to 
demonstrate effects (Williams et al., 1996) or find very short-lived effects only (Compton et al., 
2003; McKenna, 1986).   
1.3.4 Conflict Tasks 
Conflict task have in common, that the relevant target and the irrelevant distractor differ 
on a common dimension in some trials (dimensional overlap) In these conflict trials responses to 
the target are impaired when attention is captured by the irrelevant distractor. 
Emotional Conflict Task 
In order to solve the problems of the emotional Stroop paradigm, Etkin, Egner, Peraza, 
Kandel, and Hirsch (2006) developed a similar paradigm with emotional faces. In this paradigm 
emotional facial expression (happy, fearful) needs to be classified while an emotional word 
(HAPPY or FEARFUL) that is printed on the target picture needs to be ignored. The difference 
of this task and the emotional Stroop task is the dimensional overlap of target and distractor 
semantics, i.e.  both stimuli are emotional. This results in a stimulus interference in terms of 
emotion as well as a response interference. In this respect the emotional conflict task is similar 
to the flanker paradigm. It is found, that targets with a congruent distractor (i.e. both happy or 
both fearful) are classified faster than targets with incongruent distractors (Bang, Rø, & Endestad, 
T., 2016; Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006). However, 
the same is also found for the non-emotional variant of the conflict task (gender classification 
with FEMALE and MALE as distractor words). Although this task creates a conflict situation 
with a comparable control condition and thus is well suited to measure processes of conflict, the 
congruency effects represent processing of a semantically relevant feature carried by an irrelevant 
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stimulus, i.e. the results do not differentiate, if attention is captured by the emotional content or 
if the distractor just interferes with the target classification because it activates a relevant 
response.  
 
Flanker Paradigm 
The emotional conflict task (Etkin et al., 2006) that has been reported in the previous 
paragraph has a logic, that is similar to that of the flanker task. The flanker paradigm in its original 
form was designed to measure the interference of letter-distractors in a letter discrimination task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Therefore, a central target letter was presented, which was flanked by 
wo or more peripheral distractor letters. Typically, a 4:2 mapping is used, i.e. 4 different stimuli 
are mapped onto two possible responses. Thus, the flanking letters can be identical to the central 
target or they can be different, but activate the same response or they can be different and activate 
a different response. The flanker paradigm offers no direct competition of different distractors in 
one trial. Instead, like in the emotional conflict task (Etkin et al., 2006) distractors are presented 
in conflict to the target and effects are compared over different trial types. Response facilitation 
effects can be calculated by a difference between responses to prime-target-pairs activating the 
same response and those activating different responses.  Additionally, a comparison of 
compatible trials with congruent and those with incongruent stimuli that nevertheless activate the 
same response offer information on the effects at the stimulus level. Fenske and Eastwood (2003) 
developed an emotional variant of the flanker task to investigate the impact of emotional flankers 
on target classification. In a typical flanker paradigm of this kind, a central target face is flanked 
by two distractor faces on the right- and left-hand side. Participants indicate the nature of the 
central target, e.g. press a key that is mapped onto a certain emotion. Fenske and Eastwood (2003) 
obtained flanker compatibility effects, i.e. a positive difference of target-distractor-pairs that are 
incompatible minus compatible with respect to the response-relevant dimension. These were 
more pronounced for positive targets than for negative ones, indicating a greater constriction of 
the attentional focus by negative targets. Emotion compatibility effects have also been 
demonstrated by several other authors (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; 
Grose-Fifer, Rodrigues, Hoover, & Zottoli, 2013; Horstmann, Borgstedt, & Heumann, 2006, exp. 
1). Interestingly, most reported studies used schematic faces (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Fenske 
& Eastwood, 2003, Horstmann, Borgstedt, & Heumann, 2006). This suggests that attention to 
emotional faces in the flanker task might be difficult to find with natural faces.  Correspondingly, 
Moser et al. (2008) found no significant attentional bias towards threatening natural faces in 
socially anxious people but a significant compatibility effect.  
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However, Horstmann and colleagues (2006) found evidence for the hypothesis that   
differences in perceptual features rather than emotional content cause the emotion effects in 
flanker studies (e.g. Fenske & Eastwood; 2003). Therefore they reduced the schematic faces to 
non-face stimuli preserving just some salient parts of the respective original schematic face 
stimuli. Horstmann and colleagues (2006) showed flanker effects for facial stimuli as well as 
non-facial stimuli, demonstrating, that low level aspects of the schematic faces are sufficient to 
find compatibility effects.  
However, compatibility effects do not measure the actual attentional capture but instead 
a response component, that develops later in time. This can be demonstrated in studies, where 
responses are given to a second non-emotional stimulus feature (e.g. gender). Typically, flanker 
effects of the second feature (e.g. gender) replace flanker effects of emotion in this condition 
(Zhou and Liu; 2013). As mentioned, the original flanker task adopted a classical 4:2 mapping 
with four different letters mapped on two response keys. This allows to investigate response 
compatibility effects as well as stimulus congruency effects. The 4:2 mapping of the original 
flanker task however, is not realized in the modified version of Fenske and Eastwood (2003).  
Only few authors also analyzed so-called distraction effects, i.e. the amount of distraction 
in target processing by emotional distractors compared to neutral distractors, controlling for 
compatibility effects as well as target main effects (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; for a detailed 
description of distraction effects see Tannert & Rothermund, 2018, p. 4). In a study with natural 
faces Grose-Fifer and colleagues (2013) showed significant interference for distractors 
competing with happy but not fearful target faces, i.e. attention was more captured by fearful 
than by happy distractors. This effect was even more pronounced in adolescents. Chen, Yao, 
Qian, and Lin (2016) used faces generated by the face gen software (https://facegen.com) that 
are more complex than schematic faces. They found distraction effects of negative compared to 
neutral flanker faces overall and in the high socially anxious group. Interestingly, there were no 
reliable emotion compatibility effects.  
In sum the flanker paradigm has mainly been used to investigate response-based effects 
of schematic emotional faces so far. Investigations of attentional stimulus based effects of natural 
faces in the flanker task can rarely be found and results are not consistent. 
1.3.5 Cueing Paradigm 
As stated in the previous paragraph, the flanker paradigm has rarely been used to 
investigate response independent attentional effects of emotional faces. A better suited 
measurement of bottom-up attention to task irrelevant stimuli offers the spatial cueing paradigm 
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(Posner, 1980). In this paradigm targets are preceded by either centrally (endogenous cueing) or 
peripherally (exogenous cueing) presented distractors. The cue can pre-activate the actual 
position (valid) or the position opposite (invalid) to the upcoming target. After a short 
presentation time cues vanish and a fixation display is shown, followed by the target display. The 
target is presented in one of the possibly cued locations. The task is either to detect the target and 
indicate the side, or to discriminate and categorize certain features of the target, e.g. shape. In 
valid trials, attention to the cue means that the spotlight is already turned to the target location 
when the target appears. This leads to fast responses, while in invalid trials attention to the cue 
leads to a delayed response because attention is initially turned to the wrong side. The difference 
of response times between targets following invalid cues and those following valid cues is called 
validity effect. Typically, this effect is growing with the amount of attention that was directed to 
the respective cues. The spatial cueing paradigm enables researchers to disentangle response 
effects from attentional effects. Requesting a neutral response to a neutral target, a spatial cueing 
task allows researchers to attribute emotion effects to processes that happen before response 
selection (Fox, Derakshan, & Standage, 2011). 
To test whether emotional stimuli capture more attention than neutral ones (i.e., dot-probe 
paradigm) MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata (1986) used a double-cueing paradigm, where every trial 
starts with the simultaneous presentation of two exogenous cues, one at each possible target 
position. Each trial contained an emotional and a neutral cue. In either half of the trials the 
emotional cue and the neutral cue was valid respectively. Enhanced attentional capture of 
emotional compared to neutral stimuli is assumed to produce higher validity effects for emotional 
stimuli. This was confirmed in a few studies using special samples (e.g. Fox et al., 2002). 
However, this finding is mostly limited to socially anxious participants (Bar-Haim et al. 2007; 
Helfinstein et al., 2008, Klumpp and Amir, 2009) and hardly replicable in the normal population 
with non-anxious participants (Bar Haim et al. 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Van Rooijen, 
Ploeger, & Kret, 2017). 
Additionally, the dot-probe paradigm is not suited to disentangle engagement based-
effects and disengagement-based ones. Congruency effects of emotional compared to neutral 
cues in the dot-probe task can be the result of two mechanisms. Attentional capture by the 
emotional cue leads to an orientation to the position of the upcoming target in congruent trials 
leading to faster responses and an orientation to the wrong side in incongruent trials leading to 
slower responses. However, another mechanism, namely impaired disengagement from 
emotional stimuli should also lead to slower responses in incongruent trials. The latter process 
might produce smaller effects than the former, because without directed attentional capture by 
one stimulus, attention would be engaged by one of the cues by chance, i.e. engagement by the 
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emotional stimulus would occur in 50% and the probability that this stimulus is incongruent 
would be again 50%. This means, that the impaired disengagement should slow down on average 
50% of the angry incongruent trials (25% of the total trials) while attentional orientation effects 
should impair responses in 100% of the incongruent trials (50% of the total trials). However, 
since we only see the outcomes, congruency effects could possibly be both due to engagement or 
disengagement or both. Especially with long cue-target intervals it is possible that several 
attentional shifts take place until target presentation (Cooper & Langton, 2006). This problem 
can be reduced when short CTIs are used (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). Therefore, Cooper and 
Langton (2010) recommend to test attentional capture in the dot-probe task with a wide range of 
CTIs starting at 100ms or shorter and reaching up to 500ms or longer. Unfortunately, most of the 
results stem from studies using a CTI of around 500ms which promotes disengagement effects 
(Macleod et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; Egloff & 
Hock, 2003). 
 
1.4 Attentional Capture is not Consistently and 
Doubtlessly Found 
In sum, the empirical evidence for attentional capture of emotional faces is not fully 
conclusive. While singletons in the classical visual search paradigm are not independent from the 
task, evidence from additional singleton studies might be suited to inform about attentional 
capture of irrelevant distractors. However, empirical results are mixed. While some demonstrate 
attentional capture by irrelevant singleton (Theuwes, 2004), others show, that attentional capture 
of irrelevant singletons can be overridden when another search mode is adopted (Bacon & Egeth, 
2003).  Research on emotional additional singletons has rarely been published. Wentura, Müller, 
and Rothermund (2004) demonstrated attentional capture by irrelevant color-singletons that had 
been paired with gains or losses before. Similar results were obtained for fear-conditioned stimuli 
(Mulckhuyse & Dalmaijer, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2015). Huang Chang, and Chen (2011) 
demonstrated attentional capture of emotional faces that was eliminated, when the additional 
singleton was presented only briefly (300ms) and outside a pre-cued area. This casts doubt on a 
pure bottom-up account of attention but remains equivocal, because presentation time was also 
reduced. For the emotional Stroop paradigm, there is strong evidence that the effects are 
unspecific slow-downs rather than attentional in nature (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004, Mckenna 
& Sharma, 2004; McKenna & Sharma, 2004). The flanker paradigm as well as the emotional 
conflict task did reveal attentional capture of relevant attributes carried by irrelevant stimuli. This 
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however does not mean, that emotional stimuli also attract attention, when the emotion dimension 
is completely task irrelevant. In fact, it has been shown, that stimuli carrying other task relevant 
attributes also produce effects (Egner et al., 2006). Related to this, the classical effect in flanker 
studies is a response based compatibility effect. Attentional capture however should also manifest 
in stimulus based effects. Although it is possible to calculate stimulus based distraction effects in 
flanker experiments, this has rarely been done so far. Moser et al. (2008) as well as Chen, Yao, 
Qian, & Lin (2016) found attentional distraction in a flanker task with faces but failed to find 
compatibility effects. Participants of Moser et al. (2008) however, were socially anxious. 
Although attentional capture of emotional faces has been demonstrated in the flanker paradigm 
and visual search paradigms, several studies suggest, that low level features rather than emotional 
content cause the attentional effect (Horstmann et al., 2006; Horstmann, Lipp, & Becker, 2012). 
Interestingly, there are only few studies, that demonstrated attentional capture of natural 
emotional faces.  Bindemann et al. (2005) only found compatibility effects with natural faces, 
when the target was no natural face. They interpreted this as evidence for the claim, that distractor 
processing is reduced, when processing resources are limited.  
Finally, the dot-probe-paradigm seems to be suited well to demonstrate attentional 
capture of emotional faces because it allows for disentangling response-effects from attentional 
effects. Additionally, the distractors are fully task-irrelevant. However, findings from the dot-
probe paradigm are mostly relying on socially anxious samples and many studies failed to find 
attentional capture of emotional faces with normal participants (Bar-Haim et al., 2017; Victeur, 
Huguet, & Silvert, 2019) or even show a vigilance for non-threatening compared to threatening 
stimuli (Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & van Damme, 2005; Mogg et al., 2000; Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003). All in all, existing studies on attention to emotional faces are either not 
specifically designed to show pure capture effects or are conducted with special samples. Only 
few studies find pure attentional capture with normal non-anxious participants in a paradigm, that 
is suited to find them. Thus, the existence of pure attentional capture by natural emotional faces 
is, although evolutionary plausible and suggested by neuroscientific results, not consistently 
demonstrated in behavioral studies. Additionally, there are not only conflicting empirical results 
on the role of top-down and bottom-up influences on selection of emotional stimuli (eg. Lamy, 
2010; Theeuwes, 2010) but also alternative explanations of seemingly bottom-up capture effects 
(e.g. Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008; Horstmann, Lipp, & Becker, 2012; Savage, Lipp, Craig, 
Becker, & Horstmann). A very early influence of top-down attentional sets like goals and tasks 
is proposed by the contingent capture account (Folk et al., 1992), which is underlined by several 
empirical findings (see Victeur et al., 2019).  
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1.5 Current Dissertation 
The previous chapter shows that, although attention to emotional faces has been 
investigated in the past, there is no consensus on the question, if and under what circumstances 
natural emotional faces capture early visual attention. The above considerations show, that the 
interplay of different processes in attentional selection of emotional faces is rather complex and 
not yet fully understood. Concrete predictions of which emotional stimuli are selected when and 
in conflict to which other stimuli, cannot be reliably deduced so far. Therefore, the present 
dissertation aims at investigating the boundary conditions of attentional capture by emotional 
faces. In our research, we were interested in several questions: 
1. Do natural emotional faces capture attention in a purely bottom-up manner? 
2. What are the boundary conditions of early attentional capture by natural emotional 
faces? 
3. How can the identified parameters that influence attentional capture of natural 
emotional faces be integrated in a theoretical framework of attentional selection?  
Thus, the current work sets out to investigate the most basic proposed mechanism of pure 
bottom-up attentional capture of natural emotional faces and continues with systematically 
investigating the preconditions of further top-down influences.  
The first manuscript (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) was conceptualized to replicate previous 
findings of bottom-up attentional capture. Therefore, emotion was rendered fully irrelevant for 
the task. In order to rule out different alternative explanations, like inhibition of return, rapid 
disengagement or bottom-up influences, we implemented a wide range of different timings and 
also systematically varied distractor sizes, eccentricities and cue face relations.  
After not having found any evidence for bottom-up attentional capture in the dot-probe 
task, we decided to further investigate the conditions of top-down influences in attention to 
natural emotional faces (manuscript 2; Tannert & Rothermund, 2018). Therefore, we designed 
five flanker experiments. The flanker task has several advantages for our goal to progressively 
give rise to top-down influences in order to examine the boundary conditions of appearing effects 
of emotional faces.  Targets and distractors in the flanker task are present simultaneously. This 
makes it more difficult to ignore the distractors and thereby boosts possibly present but weak 
effects of emotional compared to neutral distractor faces. Furthermore, the direct competition 
creates a far more ecologically valid situation.  It has been argued in the past that a dot-probe 
study that lacks this direct competition does not permit for inferences about the mechanism of 
selection because the presentation of distractors without any relevant stimulus is not 
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corresponding to a real selection situation (Parra, Sánchez, Valencia, & Trujillo, 2017). 
Additionally, the sudden onset of the target in a dot-probe task might cover attentional capture 
effects because of the high saliency of the onset-target. In the flanker paradigm to the contrary 
target and distractor presentation start simultaneously. Finally, in the dot-probe paradigm the 
timing is very important, because with longer times between distractor onset and target onset an 
attentional dwelling begins, that impedes a straightforward interpretation of the results. This often 
leads to difficulties in interpreting null-effects because it cannot be inferred if the effect was not 
present or just invisible due to other processes that happened after the capture. Due to 
simultaneous presentation in the flanker task, attentional dwelling should not occur. In order to 
allow for top-down influences we varied task relevance of emotion, including a task, that was not 
emotional at all, one that was valence-related and one that asked for a classification of the 
concrete emotion. Additionally, we varied if flanker processing was mandatory or not. Generally, 
the introduction of mandatory distractor processing along with goal relevance of the emotion 
dimension precludes the demonstration of pure attentional capture. Still it was done in order to 
identify and delineate conditions of attentional orientation to emotional faces. Stimuli were 
presented at fixed or variable positions in different studies respectively. Based on calculations of 
distraction effects as well as compatibility effects it is possible to differentiate and individually 
investigate stimulus-based effects and response-based effects. 
Finally, in our third manuscript, we showed that attention to gender can be induced by a 
combination of task and contextual cues. Although the link to attention Is not obvious, an 
influence of distractor gender shows, that distractor faces have been processed. Specifically, it is 
demonstrated that an emotion related task, together with a context that renders gender information 
relevant, leads to a selective attention to gender information. This facilitates the procession of a 
stereotypically expected upcoming emotion.  
 
The results of the 13 presented experiments are discussed in the light of classical and 
recent findings in the literature thereby focusing on the top-down-bottom-up-debate (chapter 
5.2.). The concept of experience-based selection (Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Theeuwes, 2018) 
is brought up as a promising account which is suited to explain the present as well as previous 
results.  
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Abstract 
The gender of a face biases emotion perception: Anger is more readily detected in 
male than in female faces whereas the reverse asymmetry holds for passive emotions like 
fear or sadness. We tested the hypothesis that this gender-emotion link is related to spatial 
frequency tuning. In line with predictions, male (female) face primes facilitated the 
classification of low (high) frequency Gabor patches. Arguing against a low level stimulus-
based explanation, this gender asymmetry in spatial frequency tuning was found only under 
conditions in which gender is a relevant category (romantic context) but not in a gender-
neutral context. 
 
Key words: gender stereotypes, facial emotion, spatial frequency, face perception, 
priming 
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The decoding of emotional facial expressions is essential in almost every social 
interaction (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). People all over the world can identify the basic emotions 
when the expression is unambiguous and when there is enough time (e.g., Ekman, Sorensen, 
& Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1994). In real life, however, emotions must be decoded faster, under 
suboptimal viewing conditions, and from much less obvious expressions. People are seen 
from different distances and angles, under low or changing illumination, or with partly 
occluded faces. Especially when ambiguity is high, that is when emotions are not easily 
identifiable in a face, social categories are often used as cues in order to accomplish an 
efficient decoding of a situation, thereby guiding perception, appraisal, and action (e.g., 
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993). One easily 
accessible and useful category in this regard is gender. It is a well-established finding in the 
literature that people ascribe emotions to males and females differently (Broverman, Vogel, 
Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Williams & Best, 1990). Specifically, anger and 
contempt is more readily ascribed to men, while, happiness, fear and sadness are more easily 
ascribed to women (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007; Hess, Adams, 
Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; Plant, Kling, & Smith, 2004, Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 
2000).  
 There are multiple ways in which gender information can potentially influence 
emotion perception: The most common assumption is that gender information activates 
corresponding stereotypes that in turn influence emotion perception via expectancies and 
judgmental tendencies (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Neuronal evidence suggests 
top-down influences of social cognitive factors, like stereotypes. Several interconnections 
between brain structures that are known to be related to processing of emotional stimuli, 
faces, and social cognitive information have been identified to mediate processing of facial 
expressions based on social cognitions (Adolphs, 2003; Brothers, 1990, Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000; Kanwisher, 2000; for a summary see Freeman, Johnson, Adams, & Ambady, 
2012).  In this study, we want to test an even more subtle influence of gender categories on 
emotion perception that is due to spatial frequency tuning. Previous research has shown that 
the information that is used to identify and distinguish specific emotions is coded in different 
spatial frequency bands (Smith & Schyns, 2009): Anger is best recognized on the basis of 
information that is coded in the lower spatial frequency (LSF) bands, that is, the most 
distinctive information for anger consists in light/dark-contrasts comprising larger areas of a 
face (e.g., smooth and global changes from light to dark that are located on the forehead, the 
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brows, or the eye regions). On the other hand, sadness and fear are better recognized on 
higher spatial frequency (HSF) bands, that is, the most distinctive information for these 
emotions consists in relatively sharp contrasts covering only very small regions of the face 
(e.g., wrinkles at the edges of the eyes or the mouth). 
 Based on these findings indicating that low vs. high spatial frequencies contain 
information that is diagnostic for stereotypically male and female emotions, we propose that 
gender categories exert their biasing influence on emotion perception via spatial-frequency 
tuning (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Hübner, 1996; Sowden, Özgen, Schyns, & Daoutis, 
2003). Specifically, activating the category “male” should tune the visual system towards 
low spatial frequencies. Increasing the sensitivity of the LSF channel should yield an 
advantage in detecting typically male emotions (anger) for which the LSF band is highly 
diagnostic. Activating the category “female”, on the other hand, should sensitize the visual 
system towards processing high spatial frequencies. This kind of tuning should yield an 
advantage in detecting typically female emotions (fear) for which the HSF band is more 
diagnostic. 
 When investigating effects of social categories and stereotypes, an important 
qualification has to be kept in mind: Social categorization and stereotype activation are 
context-dependent. Which of multiple social categories (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity) is salient 
and determines the classification of a person, and which aspect of a complex stereotype 
becomes activated and is used for person perception crucially depends on the situation (e.g., 
Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Blair, 2002; Casper, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2010, 2011; Diekman 
& Hirnisey, 2007; Gawronski & Cesario, 2013; Müller & Rothermund, 2012). We thus 
expect that gender biases in emotion classification and spatial frequency tuning should occur 
if the gender of another person is a relevant and salient social category in the respective 
situation (e.g., in a romantic context). For situations in which gender is irrelevant or in which 
other aspects of the situation dominate social information processing, we expect gender 
biases in emotion perception to be less pronounced or non-existent. 
 We tested these assumptions in a priming study in which pictures of neutral-
looking male and female faces were used as primes. After each prime presentation, the neutral 
face either changed its emotional expression into angry or fearful, or it was replaced by a 
high or low frequency Gabor patch that was tilted to the left or right (see Figure 1). Depending 
on the type of the target stimulus in a given trial, participants either had to categorize the 
emotional expression or had to indicate the tilt of the Gabor patch. In addition, either a 
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gender-relevant or a gender-irrelevant context was activated during separate blocks of the 
experiment by presenting the experimental stimuli in front of background pictures depicting 
either a romantic (gender-relevant context) or a bleak scenario (gender-irrelevant context). 
Our idea was that a romantic context by default implies the presence of a man and a woman 
and activates corresponding gender specific role models and stereotypes. In a bleak scenario 
lacking specific objects and information, however, there is no direct relation to gender. If at 
all, the bleak background might be perceived as being oppressing and might activate a 
generally heightened sensitivity for threat, including both anger and fear. Even if such 
associations might become activated, they will be unrelated to gender. We thus hypothesized 
gender biases in emotion classification (anger-advantage after male primes, fear advantage 
after female primes) and in the Gabor classification task (LSF advantage after male primes, 
HSF advantage after female primes) if a gender-relevant context was activated. No or only 
weak gender biases were expected to occur if a neutral context was activated that was not 
gender-relevant. 
Method 
Sample. Sample size was calculated on the basis of our intended power of the 
experiment and the likely effect. Since our study is innovative and cannot draw on a large 
literature reporting effects for similar studies and paradigms, we decided to assume a medium 
effect size for our calculations. With a medium sized effect (d=0.5; Cohen, 1992) and a 
proposed minimum power of β=.90, 36 participants were necessary to find the intended effect 
(a priori calculations of sample size were conducted with G-Power 3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). Fourty students (17 male) from different disciplines participated for 
monetary reward.  They were recruited through advertisements on campus. Four participants 
with high error rates in either of the two tasks (outliers according to Tukey, 1977) were 
discarded from the analysis. 
Stimuli and Materials. The experiment was run on a 17’’ CRT Monitor (XGA 
resolution 85 Hz) with participants seated at a distance of 57 cm from the screen. For 
experiment control and data collection we used the open source software Psychopy 1.8.07 
(Peirce, 2007). Ten male and ten female faces were selected as experimental stimuli from the 
Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). Another four faces of each gender served as 
stimuli during the practice block. Each face was shown frontally with either a neutral, a 
fearful, or an angry expression. Faces were cut in oval and presented in greyscale in front of 
background context pictures that were retrieved from the Internet. Four colored photographs 
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depicting a bleak scene (e.g., an underground station, an old factory building) were chosen 
for the gender-irrelevant condition; another four pictures were selected that portrayed a 
romantic atmosphere representing the gender-relevant condition (e.g., showing a room with 
a fireplace and glasses of wine). Furthermore, we used round Gabor stimuli (sinusoidals) 
generated by Psychopy (Peirce, 2007, 2009). Gabors were 512 pixels in diameter and had a 
contrast of 70% and a frequency of 3.7 cycles/deg (high spatial frequency) or 0.2 cycles/deg 
(low spatial frequency), respectively. The stripes were tilted by 20 degrees leftward or 
rightward from vertical. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with two short texts, one describing a 
romantic situation, the other describing a dangerous incident. Participants were told to match 
the gender-relevant (romantic) and gender-irrelevant (bleak) background pictures to these 
texts during the experiment. Following the mental imagery task, participants practiced 
classifying the emotion expression of 32 faces by moving the mouse forward or backward 
(assignment of angry vs. fearful faces to upward/downward movements was counterbalanced 
across participants). Reactions were logged as soon as the mouse cursor reached a threshold 
of 200 pixels above or beyond fixation. In a second practice block, they had to indicate the 
tilt direction of 32 Gabor stimuli by pressing the left or right mouse-key. No context pictures 
were presented during the practice blocks. All stimuli were presented against a neutral gray 
background. The main experiment consisted of eight blocks, each comprising eighty trials. 
Within each block, one background picture was presented that was drawn from either the 
gender-relevant (romantic evening) or gender-irrelevant (bleak scene) set, that is, every block 
contained only one of the eight background photographs. The 320 emotion classification 
trials and 320 Gabor classification trials were presented in a random sequence throughout the 
experiment, so that the upcoming task was unpredictable at the beginning of each trial. 
Intermixing trials from both tasks randomly throughout the experiment was necessary in 
order to establish emotions as a relevant category during the entire task. Specifically, since 
participants did not know in advance which of the two tasks would be required in the next 
trial, they had to keep the emotion classification goal active also in the Gabor classification 
trials. 
Each trial consisted of the following sequence of events (see Figure 1). A white 
fixation cross was shown for 300 ms and was then replaced by a neutral oval cut face that 
was presented for a variable duration (500 ms to 1000 ms). Varying the duration of the prime 
presentation rendered the onset of the target unpredictable and ensured attention allocation 
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to the primes. In case of an emotion classification trial, the neutral face prime turned into an 
emotional one by replacing the neutral version of the face with either the angry- or the fearful-
looking version of the same person. In case of a Gabor classification trial, the neutral face 
prime was replaced with a Gabor stimulus. Target stimuli remained on the screen for 50 ms 
and were then removed from the screen, leaving only the background picture visible until 
participants had responded by either moving the mouse upwards or downwards (emotion 
classification task) or by pressing the left or right mouse-key (Gabor classification task). 
Incorrect responses were signaled by a 100 ms tone of middle pitch. After each block of 80 
trials, participants could take a break. 
Results 
Trials with erroneous responses and trials following a wrong response (11.71 %) were 
excluded from the RT analyses. Extreme values that were more than three interquartile-
distances above the 75th percentile of the individual RT distributions for the respective task 
(“far out” values according to Tukey, 1977; 1.94 %) and RTs that were below 200 ms (0.02%) 
were removed from the RT analyses. Three people used a switched mapping of emotion 
responses that was opposite to instructions. Their reactions were recoded.  
Gabor-Task 
RT data. A 2 (gender of the face prime) x 2 (frequency of the Gabor target) x 2 
(gender relevance of the context picture) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the Gabor-
classification trials revealed a significant main effect of spatial frequency, F(1, 35) = 4.56, p 
< .05, ηp
2 = .12, with high frequency gabors being faster classified than low frequency gabors. 
More importantly, we also found the predicted significant three-way interaction, F(1,35) = 
4.79, p < .05, ηp
2 = .12. Following up on this interaction, we calculated planned contrasts for 
the gender-relevant (romance) and gender-neutral contexts. In the gender-relevant (romance) 
context, a significant gender x frequency interaction emerged, F(1,35) = 6.69, p < .05, ηp
2 = 
.16. The pattern of means for this interaction corresponded to our prediction with Gabor 
classifications being relatively faster for low frequency target patches after male face primes 
and for high frequency target patches after female face primes than for the opposite 
combinations of face gender and Gabor frequencies. For the gender-irrelevant context, the 
interaction was non-significant, F(1,35) = 1.11, ns. Participant gender did not moderate the 
findings in theoretically relevant ways. Only the interaction of spatial frequency x participant 
gender came close to significance, F(1,34) = 3.29, p < .10, ηp
2 = .09, indicating a high spatial 
frequency advantage for female but not for male participants. This finding did not involve 
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the factors of interest (gender of the face prime, context) und thus did not relate to our 
predictions. All other effects involving participant gender were non-significant, all F < 1.5, 
p >. 20. 
Accuracy data. Error rates were arc-sine transformed before statistical analysis. The 
error analysis yielded a significant main effect of spatial frequency, F(1,35) = 7.81, p < .01, 
ηp
2 = .18, with high frequency Gabor patches being classified less correctly. The crucial 
interaction of spatial frequency, gender and context did not reach significance, F < 1.  
Emotion-Classification 
RT data. The descriptive pattern of reaction times in the emotion-classification-task 
closely matched the pattern that was found in the Gabor task: In an analysis of variance we 
found a main effect of context, F(1, 35) = 4.15, p < .05, ηp
2 = .11, with faster emotion-
classifications in the gender neutral condition. Planned contrasts revealed that within the 
gender-relevant (romance) background condition, a significant gender x emotion interaction 
was present, F(1,35) = 3.34, p < .05 (one-tailed1), ηp
2 = .09, indicating that anger and fearful 
classifications were faster for male and female faces, respectively. There was no hint of a 
gender x emotion interaction within the gender-neutral context condition, F < 1. However, 
the superordinate three-way interaction of prime gender x emotion x context failed to reach 
statistical significance, F < 1. In order to control for an influence of emotion-response 
mappings (fear-push/anger-pull vs. fear-pull/anger-pull), we included mapping as an 
additional factor into the ANOVA but found no significant effects of the factor mapping (all 
F < 3.2, all p > .05). 
Accuracy data. Error rates were arc-sine transformed before statistical analysis. The 
error-data yielded a main effect of gender with more errors after female compared to male 
faces, F(1,35) = 5.42, p < .05, ηp
2 = .13. Even though the interaction of face-gender x emotion 
x context was not significant, F < 1, the descriptive pattern replicated the one of reaction 
times, indicating that the findings were not affected by speed-accuracy tradeoffs. 
Discussion 
The present study is the first that demonstrates an effect of gender primes on 
perceptual sensitivity for processing high vs. low spatial frequencies: Low spatial frequency 
Gabor patches were classified faster after male compared to female faces while the opposite 
was true for high spatial frequency Gabor patches. This finding is indicative of an emotion-
specific spatial frequency tuning that prepares the organism for the identification of gender-
specific emotions. Importantly, such an effect of gender primes was found only when a 
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romantic context was activated, for which the gender-emotion link is of particular relevance. 
Apparently, activation of gender-stereotypical emotions – and a respective frequency tuning 
– is not a rigid and unconditionally automatic process. Instead, our findings suggest that 
gender-frequency priming is a conditionally automatic phenomenon that is triggered only by 
contexts in which gender is a relevant category. 
Besides its theoretical relevance, the modulation of the gender-specific frequency-
tuning effect by the situational context also effectively rules out alternative explanations of 
our findings in terms of purely perceptual priming effects that are driven by differences in 
low level features of the male vs. female face primes: Since the very same faces were 
presented as primes in both gender-relevant and gender-neutral contexts, any such difference 
would have resulted in a similar pattern of face-gender effects for both contexts. Since 
gender-specific tuning effects were obtained only for the gender-relevant but not for the 
gender-neutral context, however, such a purely perceptual explanation cannot account for the 
pattern of findings that was obtained in our study, in which gender-priming effects emerged 
only in the gender-relevant context condition. 
The same can be assumed for the differential influence of the context pictures. 
Although our neutral context pictures differed from the romantic pictures in that were slightly 
darker, had a different frequency distribution or a different degree of pleasantness, these 
differences cannot explain our findings. Importantly, we did not predict or find main effects 
of context on the Gabor classification reactions, but instead predicted and found an 
interaction of background and prime gender that fits with our prediction that frequency tuning 
depends on combinations of gender and specific context conditions. 
In combination with former findings of a stereotypical gender-emotion association on 
the one hand (Becker et al., 2007; Broverman et al., 1972; Plant, Kling, & Smith, 2004; 
Williams & Best, 1990) and emotion-frequency relations on the other hand (Smith & Schyns, 
2009), our findings suggest a stereotype-dependent emotion-processing framework. When a 
face is shown, people draw on the most easily available characteristics to derive information 
about potential emotional states. In an ambiguous situation, for example, when the face is 
emotionally neutral or ambivalent, or when a large distance does not yet allow for an 
unambiguous identification of emotions from facial expressions, gender information can be 
utilized to automatically generate emotion-related expectations and to prepare oneself for 
identifying and encountering gender-stereotypical emotions in one’s interaction partner. Our 
study shows that an important component of this gender-emotion priming effect consists in 
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spatial frequency tuning that sensitizes affective processing towards the detection of gender-
stereotypical emotion information. Furthermore, the influence of gender on emotion 
processing was found to be restricted to situations in which these emotions are relevant and 
can be expected (romantic contexts). 
Given that male/female face primes in combination with a gender-relevant context 
elicit both an expectation of gender-stereotypical emotions as well as a spatial frequency 
tuning that sensitizes the system for a fast and efficient detection of these emotions, an 
important follow-up question concerns the causal relation between these cognitive and 
perceptual mechanisms. Is spatial frequency tuning a precursor of biased emotional 
sensitivity that influences subsequent cognitive processes like categorization and semantic 
labelling via an increased sensitivity for emotion-specific diagnostic features? Or is an 
activation of gender-specific emotion labels and related semantic categories the first step in 
a subsequent cascade of biased processing that in turn influences basic perceptual processes 
by configuring the perceptual system in line with cognitive expectations? Our study does not 
allow us to investigate the time course or causal relations between cognitive and 
sensory/perceptual processes. Nevertheless, using variations of our priming paradigm offers 
straightforward solutions to answer these questions in further studies. To test for causal 
effects of an increased accessibility of specific emotion categories on spatial frequency 
tuning, one can investigate effects of emotion words as primes on subsequent Gabor 
classifications. The reversed causal influence can be investigated by presenting high vs. low 
frequency Gabor patches as primes for emotion word targets (e.g., using lexical decision or 
naming tasks). It should be noted, however, that the two effects need not be causally related 
at all – they could also reflect separate processes that independently contribute to 
stereotypically biased emotion processing –, nor do they necessarily have to follow a strict 
temporal ordering. 
Finally, we would like to discuss the apparent asymmetry in the strength of the 
observed effects for the Gabor and emotion categorization tasks. Although the descriptive 
pattern of findings was highly similar for both tasks, and the predicted interaction of gender 
x emotion was significant for both types of tasks within the gender-relevant context 
condition, a significant three-way interaction was obtained only for the Gabor classification 
task but not for the emotion classification task. In our view, there is a straightforward 
explanation for this difference in findings. According to our theoretical proposition, biasing 
effects of gender (and context) on emotion detection and classification are assumed to be 
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mediated via frequency tuning. Thus, whereas frequency tuning effects are an immediate 
consequence of specific gender/context combinations, gender biases on emotion 
classification represent more distal effects, and thus should be weaker than the effects that 
are visible in the frequency detection task. Additionally, when designing the study, we used 
independent response sets for the two tasks (vertical mouse movements for the Gabor 
classification task, horizontally arranged key presses for the emotion classification task). 
Using different sets of responses that are orthogonal with regard to spatial orientation and 
motor codes prevents cross-talk between the two tasks and rules out any influence of spatial 
frequency priming on emotion classifications and vice versa. However, introducing a second 
set of responses for the second task goes along with a reduced reliability for the second non-
standard form of RT measurement (mouse movements). Determining a criterion for what 
constitutes a “movement” in the respective direction is somewhat arbitrary (200 pixels), in 
addition, movement measures always reflect a combination of two components: response 
onset and response speed. Being aware that mouse movements are a less reliable RT 
indicator, we decided to use this measure for the replication part of our study: the effect of 
gender primes on emotion categorization, for which evidence already has been reported in 
the literature (e.g., Becker et al., 2007). This allowed us to reserve the highly reliable key 
presses for the innovative Gabor classification part of our study. The expected difference in 
reliability of the two response measures was confirmed in our study and became evident in 
the much larger RT variance for the mouse movements (SD = 168ms) than for the key presses 
(SD = 119ms), which explains the somewhat lower reliability of the statistical results for the 
emotion classification task. Another possible explanation for the difference in findings may 
relate to the difference in difficulty between the two tasks. As can be seen in the absolute 
RTs, emotion classifications of the face pictures took much longer than classifying the 
direction of simple stripes. Accordingly, subtle context influences may have been harder to 
detect with this more complex and demanding task. 
Conclusion 
 Our study provides first evidence for a relation between gender information 
and spatial frequency tuning. Based on previous research that established a link between 
spatial frequencies and diagnostic features of specific emotions (Smith & Schyns, 2009), we 
predicted a specific pattern of gender priming effects that was confirmed in our data: Whereas 
male face primes facilitated perceptual processing of low spatial frequencies, which are 
diagnostic for typically male emotions (anger), female face primes were followed by a 
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perceptual tuning towards high spatial frequencies, which are diagnostic for typically female 
emotions (fear). Corresponding with recent accounts of a context-dependent activation of 
stereotypes (Casper et al., 2010, 2011; Müller & Rothermund, 2012; see also Blair, 2002), 
such a matching effect of gender primes on spatial frequency tuning was obtained only when 
the face primes were combined with gender- and emotion-relevant context primes. 
  
 
40 
References 
Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 4(3), 165-178. doi:10.1038/nrn1056 
Becker, D. V., Kenrick, D. T., Neuberg, S. L., Blackwell, K. C., & Smith, D. M. (2007). The 
confounded nature of angry men and happy women. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(2), 179–190. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.2.179  
Biernat, M., & Vescio, T. K. (1993). Categorization and stereotyping: Effects of group 
context on memory and social judgment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
29(2), 166-202. doi:10.1006/jesp.1993.1008 
Blair,I.V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review. 6(3), 242-261. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0603_8 
Bocanegra, B. R., & Zeelenberg, R. (2009). Emotion improves and impairs early vision. 
Psychological Science, 20(6), 707–713. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02354.x  
Brothers, L. (1990). The neural basis of primate social communication. Motiv. Emotion 14, 
81–91. doi: 10.1007/BF00991637 
Broverman, I. K., Vogel, S. R., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson, F. E., & Rosenkrantz, P. S. 
(1972). Sex-role stereotypes: A current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues, 28(2), 59–78.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1972.tb00018.x 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin. 112 (1), 155–159. 
doi:10.1037/0033 2909.112.1.155.  
Diekman, A. B., & Hirnisey, L. (2007). The effect of context on the silver ceiling: A role 
congruity perspective on prejudiced responses. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 33(10), 1353-1366.  
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements in facial displays 
of emotion. Science, 164(3875), 86–88. doi: 10.1126/science.164.3875.86 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39(2), 175-91. doi:10.3758/BF03193146 
Freeman, J., Johnson, K., Adams Jr, R., & Ambady, N. (2012). The social-sensory interface: 
category interactions in person perception. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 6, 81. 
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00081 
 
41 
Gawronski, B., & Cesario, J. (2013). Of mice and men: What animal research can tell us 
about context effects on automatic responses in humans. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 17(2), 187-215. doi:10.1177/1088868313480096 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural system 
for face perception. Trends in cognitive sciences, 4(6), 223-233. doi:10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01482-0 
Hess, U., Adams, R. B., Grammer, K., & Kleck, R. E. (2009). Face gender and emotion 
expression: Are angry women more like men?  Journal of Vision, 9(12), 19-19. 
doi:10.1167/9.12.19 
Hübner, R. (1996). Specific effects of spatial-frequency uncertainty and different cue types 
on contrast detection: Data and models. Vision Research, 36(21), 3429–3439.  
doi:10.1016/0042-6989(96)00088-0 
Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2004). Ambiguity in social categorization: The role 
of prejudice and facial affect in race categorization. Psychological Science, 15(5), 342–
345.  
 doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00680.x 
Izard, C. E. (1994). Innate and universal facial expressions: Evidence from developmental 
and cross-cultural research. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 288–299.  
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.288 
Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception. Nature neuroscience, 3(8), 
759-763. doi:10.1038/77664 
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. 
Cognition and Emotion, 13(5), 505–521. doi:10.1080/026999399379168 
Kunda, Z., & Sherman-Williams, B. (1993). Stereotypes and the construal of individuating 
information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(1), 90–99.  
doi: 10.1177/0146167293191010 
Langner, O., Dotsch, R., Bijlstra, G., Wigboldus, D. H. J., Hawk, S. T., & van Knippenberg, 
A. (2010). Presentation and validation of the Radboud Faces Database. Cognition and 
Emotion, 24(8), 1377–1388. doi:10.1080/02699930903485076   
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically about 
others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 93–120.  doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.93 
 
42 
Maxwell, S. E., & Delaney, H. D. (1990). Designing experiments and analyzing data: A 
model comparison perspective. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Peirce, J.W. (2007). Psychopy: Psychophysics software in Python. Journal of Neuroscience 
Methods, 162, 8–13. doi:10.1016/j.jneumeth.2006.11.017   
Peirce, J.W. (2009). Generating stimuli for neuroscience using PsychoPy. Frontiers in 
Neuroinformatics, 2:10. doi: 10.3389/neuro.11.010.2008 
Plant, E. A., Hyde, J. S., Keltner, D., & Devine, P. G. (2000). The gender stereotyping of 
emotions. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 24(1), 81-92.  
doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2000.tb01024.x 
Plant, E. A., Kling, K. C., & Smith, G. L. (2004). The influence of gender and social role on 
the interpretation of facial expressions. Sex Roles, 51(3-4), 187–196. 
doi:10.1023/B:SERS.0000037762.10349.13  
R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from http://www.R-project.org/ 
Smith, F. W., & Schyns, P. G. (2009). Smile through your fear and sadness: Transmitting 
and identifying facial expression signals over a range of viewing distances. Psychological 
Science, 20(10), 1202–1208. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02427.x  
Sowden, P. T., Özgen, E., Schyns, P. G., & Daoutis, C. (2003). Expectancy effects on spatial 
frequency processing. Vision Research, 43(26), 2759–2772.  
doi:10.1016/S0042-6989(03)00480-2  
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory data analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Williams, 
J. E., Bennett, S. M., & Best, D. L. (1975). Awareness and expression of sex stereotypes 
in young children. Developmental Psychology, 11(5), 635–642.  
Williams, J. E., & Best, D. L. (1990). Measuring sex stereotypes: A multination study. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
43 
Footnotes 
Fn. 1: Methodologically, the F-test for the interaction is equivalent to a one sample t-
test that tests whether the mean for the difference variable ((RTfemale-angry – RTmale-angry) – 
(RTfemale-fearful – RTmale-fearful)) is larger than zero. Thus, given our specific predictions, a one-
tailed test is recommended in order to increase the power of the test (see Maxwell & Delaney, 
1990, p. 144). 
  
 
44 
5 Figures 
 
Figure 1  Experimental procedure. Following a background picture depicting the con-
text, an emotionally neutral face prime was presented that changed unpredictably into either 
an emotional face (anger vs. fear; emotion categorization task) or into a tilted Gabor patch 
of high or low spatial frequency (left vs. right tilt; spatial frequency categorization task). 
Responses were given with vertical mouse movements for the emotion classification task, 
and with horizontally arranged mouse key presses for the frequency classification task. 
(face photographs have been obtained from Radboud faces database; Langner et al., 2010) 
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Figure 2 Mean response times in the Gabor classification (upper part) and 
emotion classification (lower) tasks. Error-bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
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5 Discussion 
The present dissertation systematically investigated, if and under what conditions 
emotional facial stimuli capture visual attention. For this, we conducted a series of seven 
experiments using the dot-probe paradigm (Puls & Rothermund, 2017), a series of five 
experiments using the flanker-paradigm (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018), and one experiment 
using a dual task paradigm (Tannert & Rothermund, submitted). None of the overall 12 
experiments showed a pure bottom-up attentional capture of emotional faces.  
In the seven dot-probe experiments, several relevant parameters (CTI, cue-duration, 
stimulus size, subliminal vs. supraliminal presentation) were systematically varied in order to 
address previously criticized weaknesses in experimental design and apparatus that might have 
led to overlooking potential effects of emotional faces. Neither a supraliminal nor a subliminal 
presentation led to a higher interference of emotional compared to neutral distractors. This 
suggests an absence of pure attentional capture by emotional faces. 
In the second manuscript the effect of emotional expressions in the flanker task, in which 
distractors and targets were presented simultaneously (in contrast to the procedure in the dot-
probe-paradigm) is investigated. This led to direct interference and increased the chance to find 
attentional capture effects. However, experiment one and experiment two (Tannert & 
Rothermund, 2018), which were composed as a classical version of the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974), showed neither response-compatibility effects nor distraction effects. Only after 
extensive modifications that made emotions a relevant dimension and made distractor processing 
mandatory (experiment three, Tannert & Rothermund, 2018), did attentional capture effects 
emerge in the form of delayed responses in the presence of emotional distractors. Additionally, 
an absence of emotion effects in E4a and E4b (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) suggests that 
relevance of emotional faces is important for their selection. This is underlined by the fact that 
we found compatibility effects for the respectively relevant dimension (age, gender).  
Additionally, manuscript three indicates that, given certain contextual factors, task-
irrelevant stimuli are used to tune and prepare the visual system so that matching emotional 
expressions based on stereotypes are quickly detected. Although we did not replicate the effect 
of gender on emotion classification (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith 2007), we 
found an effect of cue gender on the Gabor classification that demonstrates the tuning of the 
visual system to certain spatial frequencies which is contingent on gender and a matching context. 
Considering that the second task was emotion classification, it seems plausible that the frequency 
tuning might be a top-down preparation mechanism for a faster emotion classification. This 
 
48 
mechanism was only active when emotion was relevant in the corresponding context and relevant 
for fulfilling the task at hand.  
In sum, the experiments in this dissertation suggest that natural emotional faces do not 
involuntarily capture bottom up attention regardless of task and context. Rather, given a certain 
relevance, early stimulus processing can be influenced top-down in order to preferentially select 
emotional facial stimuli.   
Taking into account the present work and the studies of other researchers in the field (for 
recent reviews see Bar-Haim et al., 2017; Victeur et al., 2019), there is a considerable amount of 
evidence against a pure attentional capture of irrelevant emotional facial stimuli. Furthermore, 
the second aim of the present work was to identify conditions of attentional capture of emotional 
faces. A thorough understanding of the exact configuration that triggers attention to emotional 
faces is still a desiderate. Therefore, the following section is supposed to identify and concretize 
these conditions of attentional effects of emotional stimuli. 
 
5.1 Relevance 
In the present work, it was shown that distractors captured attention only when they 
contained a dimension that was either task-relevant or relevant for the decision on which stimulus 
was the target. Additionally, attention was drawn to gender information only when gender was 
relevant in the respective context (manuscript 3). Thus, the present studies offer evidence for a 
superior role of relevance of emotional stimuli in determining prioritized attention allocation.  
According to the theory of priority maps relevance from different sources is incorporated 
in a calculation of conjoint relevance. This   leads to attentional shifts towards the stimulus with 
the highest resulting priority (Bisley, 2011; Itti & Koch, 2001; Itty, Koch, Niebur, 1998; Koch & 
Ullman, 1985; Niebur & Koch, 1996; Theeuwes, 2010; Wolfe, 2007; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015; 
for a discussion of the interplay of top-down and bottom-up factors see chapter 5.6.2). The 
following chapters present three main sources of top-down relevance, i.e. tasks and goals that 
have been addressed in manuscripts 1 and 2 of the present dissertation, contextual factors that 
have mainly been addressed in manuscript three, and chronic concerns. We only indirectly offer 
evidence for the latter in reporting the absence of attentional capture with a non-anxious sample 
(Puls and Rothermund, 2017), in a paradigm that has yielded emotion effects with anxious 
participants in the past. However, this third category of chronic concerns is strongly supported 
by the literature (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and should also be mentioned here. Additionally, 
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there may be other factors related to the domains of cognition, motivation, and emotion that will 
be partly discussed in Chapter 5.4. 
5.1.1 Relevance due to Tasks and Goals  
Task relevance is a very commonly investigated precondition of attentional effects and 
typically considered as evidence for top down control (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Folk et al., 1992; 
Wolfe, 1994). Attentional biases that are contingent on current goals were previously found both 
in a spatial cueing task (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, VanDamme & Crombez, 2010; Folk et al., 
1992) and the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). It was demonstrated in the context of 
priming (Feature Specific Attention Allocation Account; Spruyt et al., 2009¸ Spruyt, DeHouwer, 
Hermans, & Eelen, 2007) that processing one feature of a distractor does not mean that all 
features are processed. Rather, the relevance of the respective stimulus dimension is crucial for 
effects of this dimension on responses. Likewise, Barratt and Bundesen (2012) found flanker 
effects of emotional faces only when the task was the valence classification of the central target 
face, but not in a letter identification task.  Accordingly, Zhou and Liu (2013) found compatibility 
effects in a flanker task for color, gender, and emotion with the strongest effects for the respective 
task-relevant dimension. Similarly, Victeur and colleagues (2019) obtained attentional capture 
for faces when faces were goal-relevant and additionally for emotion when facial expression was 
also goal-relevant. Interestingly, Vogt, Lozo, Koster, and De Houwer (2010) demonstrated, that 
relevance can also result from an internal emotional state that the person seeks to regulate. They 
found attention to stimuli related to cleanliness after inducing disgust. In this case, an internal 
goal might have been to remove the source of disgust. 
In the present dot-probe-experiments (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) emotion was fully task-
irrelevant. This was done because the intention of the first manuscript (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) 
was to test whether emotional faces capture attention purely bottom-up. Without task relevance 
the dot-probe experiments did not show any difference between emotional and neutral distractors. 
In the flanker experiments to the contrary, emotion was rendered relevant (experiments 1, 2, and 
3, Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) through an emotion-related task. Although the results show that 
this manipulation alone was not sufficient to find emotion effects (experiments 1 and 2, Tannert 
& Rothermund, 2018), it led to emotion effects in conjunction with mandatory distractor 
processing. Without emotion being a relevant dimension, we found no significant differences 
between emotional and neutral faces (experiments 4a and 4b, Tannert & Rothermund, 2018). 
Thus, our experiments replicate the finding that goal relevance of emotional faces enhances 
attention to emotion. However, it is debatable, if what we consider as the current task is also the 
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current task for the participants (Becker 2018). It is open, if due to certain contextual signals, 
beliefs, or motivational dispositions other goals become more relevant than the externally given 
task or are at least included in the net-effect of top-down relevance. This reasoning is in line with 
the extant literature on contextual effects in social information processing (e.g., Blair, 2002; 
Casper et al., 2010, Casper et al., 2011; De Gelder, Meeren, Righart, Van den Stock, van de Riet, 
& Tamietto, 2006; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Müller & Rothermund, 2012; Van den Stock & 
de Gelder, 2014; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001) and appraisal theories (Brosch et al., 2008; 
Brosch & van Bavel, 2012; Pool et al., 2016).  
5.1.2 Relevance due to Context 
Contextual cues are able to trigger a broad range of different goals, tasks, risks, and 
opportunities. They vary in norms, rules, standards and expectations, elicit impressions of 
familiarity or closeness, and bring along different physical features like illumination, various 
sounds and different numbers of present stimuli. Especially relevant with regard to processing of 
emotional faces is the property of different contextual constellations to imply social norms and 
expectations concerning the display of emotions but also to activate different experiences with 
emotions that lead to certain expectations. Displaying emotions is the default in some situations 
while it can be seen as a sign of danger in others.  
The relevance of a stimulus can be modulated by contextual factors, i.e. broken dishes 
may gain a negative valence in a kitchen scene, a neutral valence in the context of a waste dump 
and a positive valence in a wedding-eve party scene which in turn influences relevance values, 
i.e. the negatively connoted dishes get higher relevance values than the positively connoted ones 
and the neutrally connoted dishes are lowest in relevance. Similar contextual modulation of 
stimulus appraisal has been found by Judd & Park (2001) for the appraisal of black and white 
people in a church context or a family barbeque vs. a street context or gang incident. Additionally, 
context might moderate the interpretation of ambiguous emotional expressions. Thus, a slightly 
surprised face might be interpreted as happy in a wedding scene but as fearful in an underground 
station.  
A related but different phenomenon is the modulation of perceived relevance through the 
interpretation of others facial expressions. When an observer encounters a person with an anxious 
facial expression, this expression serves as a relevance signal for other stimuli in the surrounding. 
Thus, the observer concludes from the anxious facial expression of a person, that somewhere in 
the surrounding is a dangerous item, person or incident, that needs to be attended. Other faces in 
the scene may then be interpreted as more dangerous as without this anxious face of the first 
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person. Thus, in this case the anxious face serves as a relevance signal. Emotions can be divided 
into expresser-relevant and other-relevant emotions. While anger is an expresser-relevant 
emotion, which signals a high relevance of the expresser, fear is an other-relevant emotion 
signaling a high relevance of someone or something in the near surrounding of the expresser 
(Peeters, 1983; Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). 
Also the counter-regulation mechanism that was proposed by Rothermund and colleagues 
(2008) as well as Rothermund (2011) can be framed as a contextual relevance modulation. In a 
context suggesting a positive outcome, negative information is preferred, while in a context 
suggesting a negative outcome there is a bias to positive information. Thus, in a loss frame it is 
relevant to process positive information in order to stay sensitive to opportunities, while 
processing of negative information might avoid risky behavior in a gain frame.  
Context-relevance has been investigated in the field of affective processing (Rothermund, 
2011; Spruyt et al., 2009; Spruyt et al., 2007) and other social psychological phenomena (Blair, 
2002; Casper, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2010, Casper, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2011; Müller & 
Rothermund, 2012; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Some contexts might activate certain 
stereotypes or attentional sets, thereby facilitating attention to emotional distractors. 
Correspondingly, several studies revealed effects of stereotypes only in contexts that rendered 
these stereotypes relevant (Casper et al., 2010; Casper et al., 2011; Müller & Rothermund, 2012).  
What is already known from social cognition, was illustrated by Schulte- Holthausen, 
Regenbogen, Turetsky, Schneider, and Habel (2016) in a flanker task. The experiment showed 
that flanker effects were contingent on the composition of emotion categories, i.e. they differed 
between experiments with a balanced composition of positive and negative emotions and 
experiments with an unbalanced composition in favor of negative emotions. When there were 
more negative than positive emotions, the latter produced more incompatibility effects as 
flankers. Several mechanisms can account for this pattern of results. One explanation is that the 
emotion composition anchors the expectable emotional range. This in turn leads to higher 
saliency of the less frequently shown and thus unexpected valence (Horstmann, 2005; Meyer, 
Niepel, Rudolph, & Schützwohl, 1991; Schützwohl, 1998). The present flanker experiments, 
however do not suggest this kind of anchoring effect. Rather in the third flanker experiment 
compatible happy trials, i.e. those trials where both stimuli were happy, appeared to be 
significantly slower than all other trials. In the study of Schulte-Holthausen and colleagues 
(2016), where effects were not calculated by controlling for target main effects explanations 
based on target effects are viable that might either refer to a general happy face advantage (Ekman 
et al., 1982; Kirouac and Dord, 1983; Ladavas et al., 1980) or to the fact that in the incongruent 
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happy flanker condition all targets were negative and relatively similar to each other. This 
however, is no problem in our studies because we controlled for target main effects. 
 In manuscript three (Tannert & Rothermund, submitted), relevance was manipulated by 
the context. A gender-based tuning of the attentional system took place when contextual factors 
made gender relevant (romantic scene), but not when gender was less relevant within the 
respective context (street scene). Thus, gender information was attended only when people 
derived from contextual cues that it might be important to know, if the person within the visual 
focus was male or female. In this example context suggested attending the gender dimension 
through learned contingencies. This effect is similar to the effects, that have been found by Casper 
and colleagues (2010, 2011).  
Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) as well as Fazio (2007) argued that only the 
relevant categories are activated in a certain situation, even when a given stimulus may belong 
to many categories. Context plays an important role in the decision on what category might be 
important, thereby influencing the evaluation of a person or item (Gawronski, Cunningham, 
LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010, Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 2003; Schwartz, 
2007). 
In a nutshell, context induces expectations and evaluations that modulate stimulus 
processing and, therefore, emotional faces capture attention in a context in which they are 
relevant. 
5.1.3 Relevance due to Chronic Concerns 
Although the current studies indicate no automatic capture of emotional faces unless they 
are relevant (task- or context-relevant), it needs to be discussed why some studies demonstrate 
the capture of emotional stimuli without establishing corresponding contextual conditions or 
increasing goal relevance. The majority of supporting results comes from clinical or subclinical 
studies with participants who were relatively anxious or have affective disorders (Bradley, Mogg, 
Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Fox, 2002; Liu, Qian, Zhou, & Wang, 2006; Mathews, Mackintosh, 
and Fulcher, 1997; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Staugaard, 2010; Yiend, 2010, for an overview 
see: Bar-Haim et. al., 2007). Additionally, the effects are usually more pronounced when the 
emotional stimuli are associated with the respective emotionally meaningful topic (Riemann & 
McNally, 1995): Socially anxious people are more vigilant about faces than people that are 
normal in social anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Staugaard, 2010). Furthermore, people with 
illness anxiety respond more strongly to stimuli associated with a disease than people without 
illness anxiety (Owens, Asmundson, Hadjistavropoulos, & Owens, 2004). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) 
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showed in their meta-analysis that anxious people have a significant bias towards threat-related 
stimuli in different attentional paradigms (emotional Stroop, dot-probe paradigm, emotional 
spatial cueing). Particularly in the dot-probe paradigm, significant emotional capture occurs only 
with participants who show high anxiety scores (Bar- Haim et. al, 2007; Bradley & Mogg, 1999; 
Mogg and Bradley, 1994). Correspondingly, high anxiety as well as attention to emotion 
preferentially occur in female participants (Tran, Lamplmayr, Pinzinger, & Pfabigan, 2013; 
Wrase et al., 2003) and participants that are low in testosterone (Tran et al. 2013; Wrase et al., 
2003; van Honk et al., 1999; Wirth & Schultheiss, 2007). Additionally, women can usually 
classify facial expressions better than men (Ladavas, Umilità, & Ricci-Bitti, 1980, Kirouac and 
Dore, 1984, Erwin et al., 1992, Hall et al., 1999, Hall and Matsumoto, 2004). It is assumed that 
anxious people have a more sensitive valence evaluation system, which makes them attribute a 
high threat potential to even minimally threatening stimuli and thus renders those stimuli more 
relevant (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In other words, emotional stimuli constitute a chronic concern 
for these people, which might explain why they respond to emotional faces preferentially, even 
when the task is unrelated to emotions and the context does not imply emotional relevance.  
Taken together, these findings show that typical psychology student samples, which 
consist of around 70% female students (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
2020), who tend to have higher social anxiety and lower testosterone than male students, can bias 
the results regarding attention to emotional faces in a way that promotes emotional capture effects 
(Bekker, 1996; Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer, & Wik,1996; Hale, 1996; Turk et al., 1998; Xu et al., 
2012). This might enhance the impression that emotional stimuli are per se bottom-up salient. 
The present experiments, however, were conducted with a mixed sample from the University of 
Jena that was recruited at the main campus instead of the psychology department. Thus, an 
absence of emotional capture effects in our experiments can be explained by a balanced gender 
distribution, an average anxiety level, and thus no heightened relevance of emotional faces.  
 
5.2 Attentional Capture Despite Absence of Emotion 
Effects 
Following the classical distinction of bottom-up vs. top-down attentional effects, we did 
not find evidence for early bottom-up attentional capture of facial expressions of emotion. One 
major argument for this conclusion is that effects occurred only when emotion was task-relevant. 
However, two accounts have been frequently applied to explain the absence of attentional capture 
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effects in response time measures without negotiating the presence of early attentional capture 
per se.  
1. The rapid recovery account (Theeuwes, 2010; Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 
2000) states that an initial salience-based attentional shift towards non-relevant 
stimuli can be corrected quickly by top-down sets via rapid disengagement 
(175ms). This leads to fast processing of top down relevant stimuli despite initial 
capture of irrelevant stimuli. Thus, this explanation is supporting the pure capture 
account.  
2. According to the contingent capture account, goals and tasks can top-down 
influence the initial capture. This results in the fact that stimuli that match the 
current target set are prone to capture attention at an early information processing 
stage (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). 
 
Both accounts assume attentional capture as well as top-down control. Nonetheless, the 
latter one supposes an initial purely bottom-up capture, which is unbiased by top-down 
attentional sets. Consequently, both explanations lead to different predictions concerning the time 
course.  
5.2.1 Arguments for Rapid Recovery in Attention Allocation to 
Facial Expressions of Emotion 
The absence of salience based capture effects in cueing experiments is mostly explained 
by supporters of the pure capture hypothesis with the notion that although capture was not 
observed it was still present initially but recovered rapidly (Belopolsky et al., 2010; Theeuwes, 
2010a, Theeuwes, 2010b). In additional singleton tasks capture effects of irrelevant distractors 
manifested at short cue-target-intervals (CTIs) and vanished at CTIs of 150ms-200ms (Theeuwes 
et al., 2000). This is seen as evidence for an initial capture which is interfered by other 
mechanisms later in time. Because in our dot-probe studies stimuli were not only presented 
sequentially but additionally target-distractor similarity in our dot-probe studies was nearly 
absent (circle/square as target vs. face as distractor), attention can be disengaged within 175ms 
(Theeuwes, 2010). Thus, in most of our studies it might have switched to target position in due 
time before target presentation, regardless of whether the distractors were emotional or neutral. 
However, within a time window of 24ms as in experiment five (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) 
disengagement is not plausible, even when there is no similarity between distractors and task-
relevant target stimuli. Consequently, experiment five (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) should have 
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shown initial pure capture even if there was a rapid disengagement process that helps to follow 
task instructions. Experiment five showed no attentional capture of emotional faces. This argues 
against a rapid recovery explanation. However, this is no evidence against the notion that salient 
emotional faces capture bottom-up attention. It is still possible that the saliency of two faces with 
a sudden onset is so high that there is only minimal added saliency due to the emotional 
expression (Theeuwes, 1994; Yantis, 1996).   
A related, commonly used argument for initial pure capture is that irrelevant distractors 
produced inhibition of return (IOR) (i.e. Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002), which is considered as 
evidence that attention has been moved to this spot, which is then inhibited for a certain time 
(Posner & Cohen, 1984). This notion leads to nearly the same predictions for timing as the 
previous. The only difference occurs when CTIs are very long because then IOR would predict 
reversed effects due to the inhibition of the target-position in congruent trials. In the present dot-
probe tasks, CTI ranged from 24ms to 1000ms. Thus, if emotional faces had captured attention 
in the present dot-probe tasks (Puls & Rothermund, 2017), the typical timing of IOR should have 
shown across the different CTI-variations, with emotion effects of irrelevant distractors being 
apparent in those experiments with a short CTI, absent with a middle CTI and reversed with a 
longer CTI. Although there might be a tendency to the described pattern in studies which included 
fearful faces, the absence of any significant emotion effect shows that there is no reliable evidence 
for inhibition of return.   
Finally, supporters of the rapid recovery account (Theeuwes, 2018) argue that a faster 
detection of targets can be attributed to bottom-up intertrial priming instead of top-down 
modulation of attentional capture in many cases where target features are known in advance 
(Müller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995; Treisman, 1988; Wolfe et al., 2003). Indeed, we varied target 
selection criteria blockwise, which is assumed to facilitate intertrial priming (Tannert & 
Rothermund, 2018). However, target selection criteria and emotion were orthogonally varied, i.e. 
receiving positive feedback for correctly classifying the emotion of a female face in trial n offers 
no emotion specific advantage in trial n+1. Additionally, we are not able to directly investigate 
the effect of knowing selection criteria in advance without a condition where target features are 
not known in advance. 
Importantly, our results suggest that attention is not captured by emotional facial stimuli 
with extremely short CTIs (24ms). Thus, our studies do not significantly support the arguments 
that are stated in favor of the rapid recovery account. However, this conclusion needs to be 
handled with care, because our studies were not explicitly designed to test the assumptions of the 
rapid recovery account.     
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5.2.2 Arguments for Contingent Capture for Facial Expressions of 
Emotion 
In contrast to the proponents of the rapid recovery account, advocates of the contingent 
capture account (Folk & Annett, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992; Folk, et al., 
1994; Lamy, 2010) argue that top-down sets can modulate attentional capture itself, i.e. they 
propose that capture does take place very early if and only if the stimulus matches the top-down 
attentional set. Thus, the contingent capture account predicts attentional capture whenever 
emotion is task-relevant. However, the present work contains three experiments where emotion 
is task-relevant (Tannert & Rothermund 2018, E1, E2, E3) with only one of the experiments 
showing attentional effects of emotion. The respective experiment deviates from the other two in 
that the flanker processing is forced by an additional target selection attribute and spatial 
uncertainty. This, however, indicates that the effect is a disengagement effect rather than a 
capture effect. Since emotion was fully irrelevant in the dot-probe studies, we cannot draw on the 
first manuscript (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) to support the contingent capture account. For this 
reasoning we would have needed to find evidence for attentional capture of emotional stimuli in 
a condition where emotion was explicitly task-relevant like e.g. in Everaert, Spruyt, and 
DeHouwer (2013, E2) or Wirth and Wentura (2018). Thus, the present data offer no clear-cut 
evidence for the contingent capture account, which again suggests, that attentional capture by 
emotional faces did not take place. 
 
In sum, our findings support neither the rapid recovery account nor the contingent capture 
hypothesis but rather suggest that irrelevant emotional faces impair target responses when 
attention has already been allocated to the respective stimulus. The present work offers no 
evidence for attentional capture of emotional faces. However, the third experiment in Tannert & 
Rothermund (2018) shows a slowdown of responses in presence of an emotional flanker, which 
impairs task fulfillment. Thus we found an involuntary effect of emotional compared to neutral 
distractor stimuli that is most probably caused by an impaired disengagement.  
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5.3 Main Findings 
In sum the present thesis leads to three main findings: 
1. Emotional faces do not capture attention in an automatic, goal-independent, fast, 
resource-free bottom-up fashion. 
2. Under certain circumstances, emotional stimuli are attended involuntarily and 
also when attending is disadvantageous for the current task. 
3. Attentional capture is the result of an interaction of bottom-up saliency and 
different variables that constitute top-down saliency, including contextual 
variables, task-constraints and chronic concerns.  
 
The above notions are inconstistent with the fear module theory (Öhman & Lundvist, & 
Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and cast doubt on a pure bottom-up-capture of emotional 
faces. Although the present findings suggest that top-down influences play an important role in 
attentional selection of emotional faces and give first hints on relevant top-down variables it still 
needs to be discussed, how exactly top-down influences interact in the selection of emotional 
stimuli. 
 
5.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
A thorough understanding of any process in human beings should include the ability to 
predict its progression and the progression of related processes as well as to mimic the process 
i.e. to deliberately trigger it. Within the framework of attentional capture of emotional faces, this 
means to correctly foresee attentional effects of emotional faces given certain defining 
parameters (goals, stimulus features, context conditions). Additionally, it means to purposefully 
elicit attentional effects under controlled experimental conditions.  
Therefore, the present chapter aims at embedding the results of our experiments into 
broader theories of attention. The goal is to understand the underlying selection mechanism more 
deeply by identifying universal selection principles. 
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5.4.1 Selective Explanatory Capacity of the Different Experimental 
Paradigms 
An understanding of the process of attentional selection needs reliable findings from 
experimental paradigms and a principle understanding of what these paradigms do. However, the 
present chapter illustrates, that the mechanism of the different attentional paradigms is not fully 
understood and why this is problematic for the reasoning concerning attentional capture of 
emotional faces. 
Bottom-up capture is characterized as fast and effortless. It is typically found in the very 
beginning of the selection process. In contrast, top-down (Posner et al., 1980) attention is effortful 
and slow. However, both accounts are challenged by findings like those in the present work: task-
irrelevant information has a fast and involuntary influence on target responses which is not driven 
by the stimulus itself but contingent on goals and other contextual variables (E3, Tannert & 
Rothermund, 2018, Tannert & Rothermund, submitted). Thus, while the effects are involuntary 
like typical bottom-up effects, they are goal directed and context-dependent like typical top-down 
effects.   
Our studies were not specifically designed to answer the question if top-down attentional 
control is executed pre-attentively, like it was assumed by the contingent capture account, or 
counter-regulates initial bottom-up capture by regulating the disengagement process. However, 
our dot-probe results clearly argue against the pure capture account and due to the broad variation 
of SOA also against the rapid recovery account. Thus, if at all the dot-probe results could be 
regarded as compatible to the contingent capture account. This reasoning is interesting, when one 
considers the findings from clinical psychology, that show attentional capture of task-irrelevant 
emotional faces for anxious participants (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Fox, 2002; 
Liu, Qian, Zhou, & Wang, 2006; for an overview see: Bar-Haim et. al., 2007). This is, given our 
proposition regarding chronic concerns as a factor of top-down saliency, in line with the 
contingent capture account.  The flanker studies however, revealed the necessity of distractor 
processing, which suggests a disengagement-based explanation. Thus, the flanker studies clearly 
argue against contingent capture.   
Interestingly, evidence in the literature for contingent capture (Folk et al., 1992; Yantis 
& Egeth, 1999) comes primarily from spatial cueing experiments (Folk et al., 1992; Folk et al., 
1994; Folk & Remington, 2006; Gibson & Amelio, 2000; Remington, Folk, & McLean, 2001; 
Pratt, Sekuler, McAuliffe 2001). On the contrary, visual search experiments, namely the 
additional singleton paradigm, mostly support the rapid recovery account and the pure-capture 
hypothesis (Theeuwes et al., 2000; Kim & Cave, 1999). Lamy (2010) criticizes this asymmetry 
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because the additional singleton paradigm focuses on the salience of the distractor vs. salience of 
the target, while cueing studies focus on the match between distractors and top-down attentional 
set.  The reason is, that although in both paradigms two stimuli are presented simultaneously, i.e. 
in direct competition, the nature and function of the stimuli in the task is very different. In Cueing 
studies, both competing stimuli need to be ignored, while in the additional singleton paradigm 
one of the presented stimuli is the target and thus needs to be attended. In cueing studies, the 
typical finding is that differences in attention between distractors occur on the respectively task-
relevant dimension. Thus, the cueing paradigm illustrates the congruency of a top-down 
attentional set with distractor characteristics. The saliency of the distractors is ignored. In 
additional singleton studies to the contrary, task-irrelevant singletons capture attention, when 
they are salient on a task-irrelevant dimension. Thereby it is manipulated if the saliency of the 
target matches the saliency of the additional singleton but it is kept constant if the attentional set 
matches the irrelevant singleton. Thus, the additional singleton paradigm shows the presence of 
bottom-up-mechanisms, but not the absence of top-down effects. 
Roque, White, & Boot, 2016 conducted a study, where they assessed attentional capture 
in several attentional paradigms in a single session with a single participant sample. They 
replicated the classic top-down effects in the cueing paradigm (Folk et al., 1992) and the 
contingent blink paradigm (Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002) and bottom-up-capture in the additional 
singleton paradigm (Theeuwes, 1992) as well as the irrelevant singleton paradigm (Yantis and 
Jonides, 1984). However, correlation analyses revealed only low correlations of attentional 
effects within the group of top-down-capture paradigms or within the group of bottom-up-capture 
paradigms. Furthermore, there occurred correlations of bottom-up-capture effects with top-down-
capture effects. Additionally, reliability of bottom-up measures was rather low.  Although we 
missed to introduce control conditions (top-down component and stimuli that are known to be 
bottom-up salient) into our cueing studies (Puls & Rothermund, 2017) to validate the design and 
exclude procedural deficits of the paradigm, it is plausible that we did not find any attentional 
capture of emotional faces because the top-down attentional set advised participants to ignore the 
absolutely task-irrelevant distractors. Thus, our results are in accordance with the results of 
Roque et al. (2016).     
A similar result was obtained by Mogg, Bradley, Dixon, Fisher, Twelftree, and McWilliams 
(2000) in the comparison of attentional effects of threatening faces in a dot-probe task and in a 
modified Stroop color naming task.  
This illustrates, that different paradigms did not by chance yield different results concerning 
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms but are conceptually differing in a way that fosters either 
the detection of top-down effects or the detection of bottom-up effects. The mentioned 
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discrepancies and the very unreliable and diverse findings of attentional processes in general are 
a problem for answering our research question, because we cannot know, if the absence of 
differences between emotional and neutral distractors is due to problems of the experimental 
paradigm or due to the (bottom-up or top-down) saliency of natural emotional faces. Thus, an 
understanding of the discrepancies between the paradigms would offer highly relevant 
information for the main aim of this thesis. 
5.4.2 Experience-Based Selection 
While dot-probe studies uncover top-down processes in early target selection, the 
additional singleton and irrelevant singleton paradigm revealed early bottom-up effects of salient 
stimuli on stimulus selection. In our flanker studies to the contrary, we found clear evidence for 
top-down regulation of attentional selection of natural emotional faces. In recent articles, 
Theeuwes (2018) as well as Failing and Theeuwes (2018) suggested to consider a third category 
of attentional processes besides bottom-up and top-down attention, that might also account for 
the differences between effects in paradigms with direct competition between target and 
distractor and those where only distractors compete: The concept of experience based selection.  
Essentially the experience-based selection account predicts a preferred processing of 
stimuli that are or have previously been associated with reward or punishment via contingency 
learning. This idea is interesting in the scope of this dissertation because emotional faces are a 
stimulus category that is frequently encountered in daily life and often paired with relevant 
outcomes that might pose reward or punishment for the respective subject. Thus, preferred 
processing of emotional faces can also be interpreted as a result of experience based selection. 
Consequently, this account might summarize several effects of top-down saliency mentioned 
above thereby integrating and explaining their contribution in the selection process.  
The concept of experience-based selection processes is grounded on assumptions 
previously published by Awh, Belopolsky, and Theeuwes (2012) as well as several other authors 
in the context of value-driven attentional capture (VDAC) or value modulated attentional capture 
(VMAC, Anderson, 2016; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, Della Libera, 2013, Le Pelley, Mitchell, 
Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016; Vuilleumier, 2015). Therefore, Theeuwes (2018) as well as 
Failing and Theeuwes (2018) suggest a stimulus selection process that is caused by implicitly 
learned contingencies between certain stimuli or stimulus selections and rewards or punishments 
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2011b; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Gottlieb, Hayhoe, Hikosaka, 
& Rangel, 2014). These contingencies are believed to have been built up in previous learning 
occasions, with strength of the attentional effects being a function of the value of the respective 
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reward. Rewarded attentional selections are more probable than non-rewarded selections. Stimuli 
associated with high rewards are more prone to attract attention than those associated with low 
rewards (Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). However, some findings 
also indicate equally strong preferences for gain-related or loss-related stimuli, that are not 
relevant in the current task anymore (Müller, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2016; Wentura, Müller, 
& Rothermund, 2014).Effects have been found for instrumental reward contingencies (Della 
Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Failing & Theeuwes, 2014 ; Hickey, Chelazzi,  & Theeuwes, 
2010) as well as for classical reward contingencies (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017; Notebaert, L., 
Crombez, G., Van Damme, S., De Houwer, J., & Theeuwes, J., 2011) and for stimuli that 
signalled the possibility of gaining a reward through a certain behavior in the past that are now 
completely response-independent and no longer signal reward in the current task (Anderson, 
2013 ; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016). Preferred 
selection of stimuli associated with high rewards was also shown on a neuronal basis (Kiss, 
Driver, & Eimer, 2009; Serences, 2008; Shuler & Bear, 2006).  
On the one hand, the experience-based selection is assumed to be much like bottom-up 
capture, i.e. fast, efficient and effortless (e.g., Bucker et al., 2015; Failing, Nissens, Pearson, 
Pelley, Theeuwes, 2015) and it overrides top-down task instructions just as bottom-up capture 
(Anderson et al., 2011a; Failing & Theeuwes, 2018). On the other hand goals and tasks pose the 
contextual framework around reward contingencies. Reward expectations are tightly connected 
to the task, i.e. a certain behavior can be expected to lead to rewards when the task is calling for 
it. Consequently the experience based selection account predicts effects of those distractors that 
have something in common with stimuli that are part of a reward contingency, may it be a 
formerly experienced and established one or an instructed contingency. Thus effects that are 
predicted by experience based selection have much in common with the effects found in the 
present experiments.   
 
Relation of Experience-Based Selection to Classical Concepts 
A logical consequence of the propositions of the experience-based selection account is 
that effects considered as bottom-up may not always and exclusively be a result of the stimulus 
inherent capacity to evoke attention (i.e. sudden onset). It may instead be the result of numerous 
exposures with the respective stimulus (a wall appearing in front of a person, a ball coming near 
fast). These exposures either established a classical contingency between stimulus and the typical 
reward that can be expected in its presence or lead to consolidation of an operant reward 
contingency. In the latter case the action (attentional shift towards suddenly appearing stimuli) 
that was most frequently rewarded (having caught the ball, arriving at the intended location) or 
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less frequently punished (ball in the face, head bangs wall) in presence of the respective stimulus 
(instrumental learning) is integrated into the operant contingency. Consequently, attentional 
effects may result from an expectation of reward/punishment in presence of the stimulus or the 
learned contingency between a certain behavior in presence of the stimulus and a reward or 
punishment. The high saliency of sudden onset stimuli, however, facilitated contingency 
learning. 
 
Saliency and Experience-Based Selection 
Experience based selection does not directly depend on saliency and is also able to 
override and modify saliency (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017; Failing et al., 2015; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2017, Yantis and Jonides, 1990). However, several researchers identified an 
interdependence of saliency and experience-based learning (e.g. Wang, Yuan, Yan, & Li., 2013). 
On the one hand, contingencies can lead to increased saliency (e.g. Failing & Theeuwes, 2014; 
Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Kiss et al., 2009) or at least to changes in stimulus 
representation on the saliency map (Chelazzi et al., 2014; Theeuwes, 2018) that are equal to the 
“sharpening” concept by Desimone (1996). On the other hand, however, physical saliency makes 
certain stimuli more prone to be integrated in contingencies than non-salient stimuli because of 
their physical advantages (Failing and Theeuwes, 2018) in rivalry with other present stimuli. 
Thus, salient stimuli have a better figure to ground ratio and may be processed more easily. This 
leads to faster formation and higher strength of contingencies related to salient vs. nonsalient 
stimuli (e.g. Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theuwes, 2010; Le Pelley, Pearson, 
Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). However, saliency alone might not be sufficient to initiate an 
attentional capture. Likewise, top-down tasks may boost the probability of contingency formation 
by increasing the probability for processing the respective stimulus, which is a precondition for 
the stimulus to become part of a reward contingency (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011b; Theeuwes & 
Belopolsky, 2012). This might explain, why saliency, that has been believed to be a purely 
bottom-up property is not always leading to attentional capture irrespective of the task. And more 
heretically this might even suggest, that experiences with stimulus characteristics such as sudden 
onset or bright color are at least a necessary condition for their bottom-up saliency. This in turn 
would mean, that bottom-up saliency results from the interplay of reward learning and physical 
discriminability and becomes automatized due to repeated exposure. Thus, what is called bottom 
up saliency, might just pose the most automatized end of the top down relevance continuum. 
Experience-Based Selection in the Context of the Present Findings 
All in all, the concept of experience-based selection nicely fits the main message of the 
present paper, i.e. ‘relevance matters’, and might either be an additional mechanism that shapes 
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relevance or the underlying structure that determines how all other mentioned aspects shape 
relevance. Certainly, emotional faces are a category that is related to many experiences and 
resulting reward contingencies in every human subject. The importance of contextual cues for 
the attention to emotions as well as the preference for anxiety related stimuli in anxious people 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007) can be explained by reward contingency episodes. A preferred attention 
to gender stimuli in the context of romantic scenes with the intention to classify emotions 
(Tannert & Rothermund, submitted) might go back to strongly rewarded experiences as well as 
reward expectations, such as Liefooge et al. (2012, 2013) demonstrated. However, many findings 
concerning experience-based selection do not focus the question, if the attentional prioritization 
can be considered attentional capture. In a search-paradigm, Notebaert and colleagues (2011) 
found attentional prioritization of conditioned color stimuli. However, the search slopes indicated 
that search was not parallel, which suggests that the attentional prioritization was no capture. 
The differentiation of classical and instrumental learning might be relevant when 
interpreting effects of different attentional paradigms. The dot-probe-paradigm is more prone to 
activate classical contingencies because distractor processing does not require behavior. Flanker 
experiments to the contrary may trigger instrumental contingencies in addition to the classical 
ones, since an action is requested while attentional competition continues. Consequently, there 
might be settings where contingencies are build up in a classical manner in a setting, where no 
actions were available to modify the outcome. These contingencies might lead to attentional 
capture of the respective conditioned stimuli in a dot-probe task, but not in a flanker task.  
Conversely contingencies, that have been built up as instrumental contingencies, might lead to 
effects in flanker-studies but not dot-probe studies. 
 In a nutshell, the present work shows an absence of bottom-up attentional capture of 
emotional faces and, under certain circumstances, attentional effects of emotional stimuli that are 
involuntary, i.e. cannot be considered as top-down. Thus, the concept of experience-based 
selection seems promising to explain these seemingly contradictory effects. 
 
5.5 Methodological Challenges 
The present dissertation offers some clear-cut conclusions that are based on a systematic 
investigation of the effects of emotional faces on attention. However, the present studies have 
some shortcomings that might qualify the interpretation of the present data. These limitations 
will be addressed in the current chapter. 
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5.5.1 Overlap of Features 
In the flanker experiments we did not find attentional effects until we made emotion task-
relevant and flanker processing mandatory. However, we tried to boost flanker processing by 
including a target definition task that required participants to find the male (female) face and 
classify its emotion. However, gender and emotion have been found to highly overlap in visual 
features (Becker et al., 2007; Hess, Adams, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009), i.e. female faces overlap 
with features of sad and anxious faces while male faces show characteristic features of angry 
faces. This might account in some way for emotional effects as well. For example, an emotional 
distractor could be more distracting than a neutral one, because in half of the trials the gender-
typical features do not correspond to the displayed emotion. This deviation elicits a certain 
saliency. Apart from feature-related explanations, also a deviation of displayed and 
stereotypically expected emotion of the distractor face could account for a delayed target 
processing (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). In both cases neutral facial expression does 
not interfere with either male or female gender information. Thus, a different target identification 
task should be applied in order to rule out alternative explanations concerning featural overlap. 
5.5.2 Singleton-Target Prevented Processing of Distractors 
Another methodological issue that challenges the claim, that mandatory distractor processing is 
part of the attentional effects found in flanker experiment 3 (Tannert and Rothermund, 2018) is 
the singleton status of the targets in the flaker experiments 1 and 2 (Tannert & Rothermund, 
2018). The difference between the two studies in manuscript two (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) 
which show no effect despite task relevance of emotion (E1 and E2, Tannert & Rothermund, 
2018) and the one that shows an effect (E3, Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) was, that in the latter 
one flanker processing was mandatory due to spatial uncertainty of the target. Although task 
relevance was given in all three of them, in only one of these experiments emotional distractors 
lead to a stronger delay than neutral. Thus, we argued that while top-down goal relevance was 
not sufficient to modulate the initial shift towards the emotional of both distractor faces, it was 
sufficient to render distractor processing mandatory.  However, in flanker experiments 1 and 2 
participants could not only easily identify the target because of its singleton status and its fixed 
position, but also inhibit the fixed distractor positions. To rule out these alternative explanations, 
additional studies should be conducted where presentation mode (fixed position vs. variable), 
singleton status, and the number of distractors (as a related factor) are manipulated independently 
from mandatory distractor processing.  
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5.6 Future Directions 
In the previous chapters we elaborated attentional effects of emotional faces based on two 
series of systematic investigations in two different attentional paradigms and one additional 
experiment using a dual-task paradigm. The presented evidence integrates previous single 
findings and corroborates the assumption that emotional faces do not automatically capture 
spatial attention. However, our results raise further questions that our experiments were not 
designed to answer. Therefore, this chapter will illustrate some important future directions. 
5.6.1 Perceptual Load 
In manuscript two (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) we shortly mentioned the problem of 
perceptual load especially when natural faces are used. Although this problem is no argument 
against natural faces, because they still offer important ecological validity, it needs to be 
discussed to what extent the conclusions of this thesis are affected by the problem of perceptual 
load. Lavie and Tsal (1994, see also Lavie, 1995, 2000) propose, that participants scan the whole 
visual field for relevant information as long as enough capacity is available. Thus, attentional 
capture by irrelevant distractors is more likely when attentional resources are not fully exhausted. 
However, Lavie and colleagues (2003) showed that, non-facial distractors’ but not facial 
distractors’ capacity to distract was reduced by perceptual load. Thus, facial distractors were 
processed irrespective of the set size and could not be eliminated by increasing the perceptual 
load. However, in our flanker experiments (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) targets and distractors 
were natural faces and thus competed for attention directly. Additionally, the task was rather 
demanding. Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins (2005) found flanker effects of emotional natural 
faces only when the target was no face. This suggests a capacity limit that prevents processing of 
natural flanker faces, when a second, more relevant complex face is present. Accordingly, 
Mohamed, Neumann, & Schweinberger (2009) found tremendous reduction of the face-sensitive 
N170 under high perceptual load, suggesting an impaired face processing under high load. 
Additionally, Martens, Leuthold, & Schweinberger (2010) as well as Schweinberger, Burton, & 
Kelly (1999) found that processing of emotional expression (happy vs. angry) was not 
independent of identity processing. In the Garner interference paradigm (Garner, 1974; Garner 
1976) facial expression could be ignored when identity or gender was processed but not the other 
way round (Atkinson, Tipples, Burt, & Young, 2005; Baudouin, Martin, Tiberghien, Verlut, & 
Franck, 2002; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998, Schweinberger et al., 1999). The findings suggest 
that in contrast to the assumption of independent processing (Bruce and Young, 1986) emotion 
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classification requires identity and gender information. This is consistent with our findings in 
manuscript 3 (Tannert & Rothermund, 2020), where gender-dependent stereotypical information 
was consulted in order to prepare for emotional processing.  
This could be another relevant factor, that partly causes the differences in attentional 
capture between schematic and natural faces. While natural faces are prone to offer a clue on 
emotional expression via identity and gender information, schematic faces are completely 
uninformative in this respect. This should clearly reduce complexity and lead to more capacities 
for distractor processing. Thus, an absence of attentional effects of emotional faces might be 
caused at least in part by the use of natural instead of schematic faces. 
  Additionally, the dependent parallel processing of identity/gender and emotional 
expressions corroborates the idea that perceptual load has impaired distractor processing in our 
studies, where always at least two faces with different identity appeared. Consequently, the 
absence of emotion effects in E1 and E2 (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) might be attributed to 
perceptual load. We could argue that E3 (Tannert & Rothermund, 2018), which yielded emotion 
distraction effects, was comparable to these experiments in complexity and stimulus composition, 
indicating no major influence of perceptual load on expected emotion effects. However, in E3 
(Tannert & Rothermund, 2018) the target defining characteristic was gender, i.e. the participants 
knew (block-wise) that the upcoming target (distractor) will be male (female). This might have 
led to a reduction of complexity and thereby might have released processing capacities. Based 
on this, some researchers might argue that stimulus complexity and resulting capacity limitations 
might not only have counteracted attentional effects in the flanker experiments (Tannert & 
Rothermund) but might also have caused the absence of capture in the dot-probe studies (Puls & 
Rothermund, 2017). Although studies 4a and 4b suggest at least some distractor processing by 
revealing compatibility effects of the respective task relevant dimension, future studies should 
keep in mind the perceptual load hypothesis and try to rule out this alternative explanation by 
careful planning. Investigations might contain a natural face condition and a schematic face 
condition.  
 
5.6.2 Relevance Maps and the Context-Dependency of Top-Down 
Task-Relevance 
We showed that attention to emotional faces is not determined by the stimuli alone via 
bottom-up saliency but depends on certain top-down influences. This suggests, that the processes 
that are active in attentional selection of emotional faces are structurally comparable to those in 
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attentional selection of other stimuli. We identified contextual information and task as relevant 
factors. However, it is still unclear, how exactly these factors contribute to the process. Many 
models have been proposed to account for bottom-up saliency (for a review see Itty & Borji, 
2015). However, only few scientists described how exactly top-down saliency contributes to the 
conjoint relevance (Cave & Wolfe, 1990; Navalpakkam & Itti, 2015; Oliva et al., 2006). But even 
in these models top-down factors are mostly reduced to information on target defining features 
and probable target locations. Influences from complex background pictures like those in Puls 
and Rothermund (2017) or learning history that has been proposed in the context of experience 
based-selection however, might interact with other saliency factors in a rather complex fashion 
which is not further explored yet. There might be variables that add up linearly to form a summed 
top-down saliency value (Brosch et al., 2011; Zoest and Donk, 2004). However, most probably 
certain characteristics of the context rather act like moderators that can modulate the influence of 
others in an interactive multiplicative way. This is supported by empirical findings. Bacon & 
Egeth (1994) tested for the selection of the search mode in response to certain task demands and 
its consequences for the influence of target distractor similarity and distractor saliency. They 
found, that bottom-up influences were contingent on a feature search mode was only adopted 
when a bottom-up singleton detection mode was ineffective. Thus, as long as singleton search is 
effective enough, feature search is avoided even when the target features are known. TBacon and 
Egeth (1994) argue, that participants voluntarily decided to adopt a more convenient search mode 
instead incapable of ignoring the salient singleton. This argues against a purely additive 
calculation of relevance on the salience map. Rather it suggests an interactive account.  
Future research attempts should aim at explicitly designing studies that reveal more on 
the interplay of the different factors mentioned here. The idea of experience based selection has 
been introduced in chapter 5.4.2 and might be a viable account to integrate several factors, that 
have been identified to moderate attention to emotional faces apart from stimulus inherent 
characteristics.  
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6 Conclusion 
Considering our own results and those reviewed in the current dissertation, I conclude 
that emotional faces are not unconditionally salient in the sense of a preferred bottom-up 
selection. Instead, as it is the case for most other stimuli, the preferred processing of emotional 
faces is contingent on individually varying and changeable relevance in the present situation. 
When people must choose to attend to emotional or non-emotional stimuli they will preferentially 
attend to those which are most relevant to them in the current situation. In this respect, relevance 
is dependent on the person’s goals, tasks, reinforcement history, contextual factors, and perhaps 
other not yet investigated variables. This does not necessarily mean that a person can solve his 
or her current task or problem without any distraction. Rather, people seem to attend to stimuli 
that match the current set of goal-relevant properties preferentially, i.e. the more similar the 
distractors are to the momentarily relevant stimuli, the more difficult it is to ignore the distractors. 
Our data is not sufficient to finally decide whether the top-down influence on early stimulus 
selection meets the principles of contingent capture theory (Folk & Annett, 1994; Folk & 
Remington, 1998; Folket al., 1992; Folk, et al., 1994; Lamy, 2010) or whether it follows the rapid 
recovery account (Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b; Kim and Cave, 1999). The predictions of the 
different accounts should be tested in additional experiments, like e.g. a cueing paradigm that 
includes a condition where emotion is task relevant. However, it might be that neither of the two 
theories can account for the effects but rather the newly proposed experience-based selection 
approach, which has yet to be tested. Therefore, future studies should focus on the different 
attentional patterns in different experimental paradigms, applying the principle of experience-
based selection. This could scrutinize possible hypotheses that can be derived from this relatively 
new concept. The concept of experience-based selection sets a promising framework to explain 
the partly inconclusive results, which neither fit the characteristics of bottom-up capture nor are 
volitional like a top-down process.  
 
Jan Theeuwes closes his considerations on experience-based selection with the notion 
that visual selection may not be a ‘deliberate choice’ (Theeuwes, 2018, p. 9). Rather experiences 
create ‘a universe that is automatically forced upon us’ (Theeuwes, 2018 p. 9). I agree. However, 
since the value of all rewards depends on our personal preferences and needs, every person acts 
automatically in accordance with what they would aspire, if they were voluntarily choosing their 
behavior. Thus even though stimulus selection seems to proceed involuntarily in this certain 
moment, the result will be on average the most desired. 
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